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Three years after the Kosovo conflict, the Balkans remains politically and socially 
unstable as well as economically depressed.  Even though Slobodan Milosevic has gone, 
he has left behind him a legacy of destruction and distrust.  The mechanisms, 
instruments, and models of international relations that provide a framework for producing 
security and promoting development such as creation of alliances, diplomacy, and models 
of security communities, did not produce the expected results.  Therefore, a high potential 
for renewed conflict remains acute.  Across the Balkans, integration and stability are still 
in their infancy due to strong nationalism and under -performing economies.  Taking into 
consideration that complex crises such as that in the Balkans usually have their origin in 
long-term circumstances, it is understandable that investigating the long -term, deep 
historical roots of a conflict is important in identifying possible solutions.  One of the 
main reasons that Western Powers adopted a reluctant attitude towards the Balkans 
crises, or did too little too late, was misunderstanding the nature and the origin of the 
conflicts from the beginning.  Without knowing where the region is coming from, it is 
impossible to construct where the region should be heading.  This thesis outlines a brief 
history of the region that provides the context for the current situation.  It demonstrates 
the impact of ethnicity, religion, language, culture, and economics in shaping the 
conflicts in the Balkans.  Furthermore, it analyzes the current security and economic 
situation in the region.  Finally, it provides some security and economic 
recommendations, which offer guidelines for implementing what the author considers the 
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This is the Balkans—rationality isn’t a reliable compass.1 
Three years after the Kosovo conflict, the Balkans remains politically and socially 
unstable as well as economically depressed.  The mechanisms, instruments, and models 
of international relations that provide a framework for producing security and promoting 
development, such as creation of alliances, diplomacy, and models of security 
communities, did not produce the expected results.  Even though Slobodan Milosevic is 
gone, he has left behind him a legacy of destruction and distrust.  Therefore, a high 
potential for renewed conflict remains.  Across the Balkans, integration and stability are 
still in infancy due to strong nationalism and under-performing economies. 
The past decade of wars and transition has been exceptionally difficult for the 
people of the Balkans.  Two major factors, nationalism and economic decline, which fed 
off each other, are mainly responsible for the dramatic situations that arose in the 
Balkans.  The absence of political consensus for reform constrained economic 
development and served as a motivation for overwhelming nationalism.  This 
nationalism, with ethnic purit y as its chief goal, has deep-seated resentments.  Even 
though there are clearly differences in the security situations of the individual countries, 
the region as whole is unstable and insecure.  Post-conflict construction initiatives have 
not solved the security tensions and it seems that the most successful businesses in the 
region are organized crime and trafficking of drugs, human beings, and weapons.  
In the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict the international community launched the 
Stability Pact as a new major effort for de-Balkanizing the Balkans to the point where, 
according the inauguration speech of Finnish President Ahtisaari, “war becomes 
unthinkable.”2  However, the Macedonian crisis, which reached the boiling point on June 
                                          
1 Roger Thurow and Toni Horwitz, History’s Lessons,  The Wall Street Journal, October 7, 1992, p. 
A1. 
2 In the Sarajevo Summit, 29/30 July 1999, the internationa l community launched the Stability Pact.  
The summit was chaired by Finnish President Ahtisaari because Finland held the rotating presidency of the 
European Union. Information Available online: www.summit -sarajevo-99.ba/index1.htm. 
2 
01, showed that the Stability Pact has been slow to advance from conferences to concrete 
commitment.  Thus, confrontation still seems to be an easier option than cooperation.  
Taking into consideration that complex crises such as that in the Balkans usually 
have their origin in long-term circumstances, it is understandable that investigating the 
long-term, deep historical roots of a conflict is important to identifying the possible 
solutions.  One of the main reasons that Western Powers adopted a reluctant attitude 
towards the Balkans crises, or did too little too late, was misunderstanding the nature and 
the origin of the conflicts from the beginning.  Without knowing where the region is 
coming from, it is impossible to construct where the region should be heading.  
B. THESIS ORGANIZATION  
In the first chapter of the main body (Chapter II), I outline a brief history of the 
region to provide the context for the current situation.  In Chapter III, I demonstrate the 
impact of ethnicity, religion, language, culture, and economics in shaping the conflicts in 
the Balkans.  In Chapter IV, I analyze the recent roots of conflicts.  First, this chapter is 
about the impact on the Balkans of the disintegration of international order.  Second, it 
explains the relationship between economic decline and the rise of nationalism, and their 
combined effect on the conflicts in the Balkans.  In Chapter V, I examine the current 
economic situation of the region.  Further, in this chapter, I analyze and demonstrate 
lessons learned from the deep political and economic crises in Albania.  This chapter also 
demonstrates the key economic and security challenges that the region is facing.  Finally, 
in Chapter VI, I provide some economic and security recommendations, which offer 
guidelines for implementing what I consider to be the right path of direction for de-
Balkanizing the Balkans. 
My intention is not only to draw attention to all the domestic and international 
actors who want to assist the Balkan but also to provide some possible directions for 
more sustainable actions to take for the integration of the region into a prosperous and 






1. South Eastern Europe  
For the purpose of this thesis, South Eastern Europe or the Balkans include 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Rumania, Kosovo, Bosnia and He rzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, 
and Albania.  Slovenia’s progress over the last decade has left this country out of the 
group of countries that are considered as problematic.  Greece is considered a de -
Balkanized country.  
2. Balkanization 
The expression “balkanization” appeared in the aftermath of the First World War.  
Balkanization is the process of nationalist fragmentation of former geographic and 
political units into new, viable but problematic and unstable units such as the Balkans 
during the Balkan wars 1912-13.3  
3. Ethnicity  
A collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive 
shared culture, an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity are all 
dimensions of ethnie.4  Thus, ethnicity is a matter of myths, memories, values, and 
symbols which reinforce the differences between groups.  This definition establishes two 
important elements for understanding ethnic identity.  First is determining who cannot 
belong to the group.  Second is the fact that ethnic identity is framed in a context, where 
ethnic groups view a gain by another group as their loss.  Compromises, therefore, is 
viewed as a sign of weakness.5 
                                          
3 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 33. 
4 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations,  Blackwell, Oxford UK & Cambridge USA, 1987, 
pp. 20-23. 
5 William T. Johnsen, Deciphering The Balkan Enigma: Using History to inform Policy , Strategic 
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BALKANS 
What these nations are now depends on where they were when.6 
The Balkans has been shaped by a unique history.  Like no other part of the 
continent, it was ruled for two millennia by a series of multinational empires.  These 
multiethnic empires generated a mosaic of peoples, languages, religions, and cultures that 
has been a unique source of perpetual conflicts.  Taking into consideration that an 
understanding of the past has a great importance for informing the present and for 
preparing the future, it is clear that to predict where the Balkans should be heading 
requires knowing where it came from. 
In this chapter, I will first demonstrate the impact of geography on the history of 
the Balkans.7  I will also demonstrate that since ancient Greece and Rome up to the 
present, with the exception of the communist regimes, conflict has been a way of life 
along the Balkans’ countries.  
A. THE IMPACT OF GEOGRAPHY ON THE BALKANS’ HISTORY 
The word “Balkan” means mountain in Turkish.  The Balkans is appropriately 
named because mountains represent the predominant characteristic of the region.  In any 
relief map of the Balkans, three main mountain ranges can be identified: (1) The 
Carpathian Mountains in Romania run south of the Danube in northeast Serbia and 
northern Bulgaria, (2) The Balkan and Rhodope Mountains in Bulgaria surround the 
Maritsa Valley of Bulgaria and trend toward the northwest to cross the Morava -Vardar 
depression in former Yugoslavia, (3) The Dinaric Alps of Yugoslavia and Albania trend 
southeast of the Julian Alps up to the mouth of Drin River and continue inland along the 
Albano-Yugoslav borderlands.8  The great mountain chains not only fragmented the 
region geographically and, therefore, isolated the people from one another, but they also 
                                          
6 Morris Massey, The People Puzzle: Understanding Yourself and Others , Reston, VA: Reston Press, 
1979. 
7 The geographic character of the region has had a key influe nce on the evolution of ethnic, cultural, 
and national groups of the area and, therefore, had a great impact on the Balkans’ development.  Thus, 
before investigating the region’s history, a short journey into its geography is helpful.  
8 George W. Hoffman, The Balkans in Transition, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1963, p. 12. 
6 
contributed to the ethnic, cultural, and political divisions.  “Lacking a geographic center, 
the peninsula became divided into a number of small states which were generally in 
conflict with one another.”9  
However, the historic paradox of the region lay in the fact that the mountain s 
served as a barrier only to the settled inhabitants while, on the other hand, promoting 
external access to the region.  Unlike the Italian peninsula, cut off from continental 
Europe by the Alps, the Balkan Peninsula lies open to the north providing an ea sy access 
from central Europe.10  Lying between Asia Minor and the Mediterranean Sea to the east 
and south and the abundant European plains to the north and west, three main invasion 
routes divide the Balkans.  The north-south route runs from Belgrade to Thessalonica.  
The east-west route runs from Morava through Sofia to Constantinople.  In addition to 
these main routes, the Romans built a great road, called Via Egnatia, which begins in 
Durazzo on the Adriatic coast of Albania and moves across Albania and Northern Greece 
terminating in Constantinople.  Thus, the Balkans, considered from the outside, is a 
substantial bridge connecting east and west.  It is at a crossroads where Christianity meets 
Islam and where the great roads from the Middle East and Africa go through Europe.  
Because of the synergistic impact of the two aspects, inner fragmentation and 
external access, the Balkans countries were uncommonly subject to external effects.  On 
the one hand, the inhabitants were not able to gather together to resist outside pressure; 
on the other, foreigners could easily enforce their will. Therefore, the peoples of the 
Balkans, separated from each other and divided among themselves, were intensely 
affected by the political, religious, cultural, and economic influences which derived from 
the great centers of Europe.11  The great imperial powers of the past—Romans, Turks, 
Austrians, Germans, French, British, and Russians—all have dominated or sought to 
dominate this region.  Thus, the geography made its inevitable con tribution to the 
Balkans’ history.  
 
 
                                          
9 Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Balkans, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965, p. 3. 
10 Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans In Our Time, Harvard University Press, 1956, p. 19. 
11 Ibid, p. 20. 
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B. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OUTLINE 
1. Ancient Macedonian and Rome 
The recorded history of the Balkans begins with ancient Macedonia.  Taking 
advantage of Greek weaknesses, Philip of Macedon defeated the Greek armies and 
established Macedonian domination in the region.12  After the death of Philip, his son, 
Alexander the Great, successfully expanded his empire through invasions southward 
through Egypt and eastward through Persia to India.  After Alexander’s early death, his 
successors proved unable to sustain his empire which collapsed under internal strife and 
war.13 Ingredients of the empire gradually declined and expansionist ambitions of Rome 
were definitely realized in 146 B.C. by the entire region.  For around four centuries, the 
conflicts were still present in the region because of Roman invasions and defense of their 
Empire.14  
2. Byzantine Empire (from the Fourth Century to the Fifteenth)  
Being under increasing pressure, mostly from barbarian invasions coming from 
western and central Europe, the Roman Emperor Constantine, on the 11 th of May in the 
year A.D. 330, dedicated the Greek city of Byzantium (currently Istanbul) as the new 
capital of the Roman Empire.15  
Divisions between the eastern and western parts of the empire incr eased rapidly.  
“By A.D. 395, the Roman Empire cleaved in two with the border cutting across modern 
day Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.”16  While the Germanic barbarians were kept out 
of the eastern part of the Empire, they fell in all their force upon the western part.  After 
the collapse of the western part of the Empire (in the fifth and sixth centuries), the 
Byzantine Empire emerged as a major power in the world theater.  
                                          
12 The century-long conflicts between Athens and Sparta for control on the Greek peninsula [the 
Peloponnesian Wars (460-404 B.C.)] seriously undermined the Greek city-states.  Barbara Jelavich, History 
of the Balkans,  Vol. I, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century , New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 
pp. 5-7. 
13 Ibid, p. 7 
14 For a brief discussion of the wars and conflicts of the Roman Empire, see Dupuy and Dupuy, The 
Encyclopedia of the Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present, New York: Harper and Row, 1986, pp. 
85-125.  
15 Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans In Our Time, p. 50.  
8 
Even though the Byzantine Empire kept control of the Balkans until 1453, when 
the Turks finally took over the Byzantium, the Bulgar and Slav disturbance seriously 
threatened it in the northern part.  The Byzantine Empire brutally resisted the Bulgar 
encroachments.  Slavery or entire eradication was the destiny of the defeated.  For 
instance, the Byzantine Emperor, Basil the Bulgar -Slayer, not happy with annihilating his 
opponents, “had 14,000 captives blinded and sent home as an example.”17  In the ninth 
century, the Bulgarian ruler defeated the Byzantine Emperor Nicephorus I, killed him an d 
took his scull, which was hollowed out and lined with silver to use as a drinking cup.18 
After fighting with the Roman Catholic west over the south Italian lands, the 
Byzantine Empire, in the beginning of the thirteenth century, fought against the Serbs, 
who now rose to create their own powerful state.  The suddenly death of Stephen Dushan, 
the Serbia’s most famous ruler, shifted the fate of the war on the side of the Byzantine 
Empire.  Thus, a continual character of violence shaped the relationship of the  Byzantine 
Empire with the Balkans’ provinces.  
Despite pressure from the north, the more critical threat rose from the east, where 
Arabs, Persians, and Ottomans attacked Byzantium.19  The Ottomans successfully 
surround and captured Constantinople in 1453, replacing over 1000 years of Byzantine 
rule in the Balkans. 
3. Ottoman Empire (from the Fifteenth Century to the Eighteenth)  
The fall of Constantinople marked the definite realization of the conquest of the 
Balkans.  The suppressive nature of the Ottoman Em pire made violence and cruelty 
commonplace in the Balkans.  “The staking of heads and impalement were regular 
methods of public control.”20  It is understandable that oppressive measures used by 
                                          
16 William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy , Strategic 
Studies Institute, 1995, p. 13.  
17 Ibid, pp. 12-13. 
18 Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans In Our Time, p. 52. 
19 In the middle of the fourteenth century, one of the parties to the competition for the Byzantine 
throne invited the Turks as mercenaries into Europe.  They campaigned successfully first against B ulgaria 
and after against Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The Turks were blocked in their campaign against 
Albania from the resistance of George Castriota, an Albanian national hero, who won from the Pope the 
epithet “athlete and battler for the Christ ian name,” Ibid, pp. 56-58. 
20 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Vol. I, p. 232. 
9 
Ottomans led to numerous uprisings.  Thus, revenge brought revenge in a growing spiral 
that shaped the relationship between the Ottomans and the Balkans throughout the 
Ottoman occupation.  The repressive Ottoman rule forced many peasants in the Balkans’ 
countries to take the mountains and organize a social and political resistance.  
Throughout the Balkans’ history, the Hajduk (as he is known in former Yugoslavia) has 
been a hero of popular legends and songs.  The Hajduk, a Balkan Robin Hood, kept alive 
the hope of the Christians, and formed a significant element in the wars of liberation.  
Here can be found the roots of the long traditions of resistance against governments or 
outsiders.  This tradition continued with the numerous ethnic and religious irregular 
forces that came out during the last decade’s conflicts.21 
Two factors figured prominently in the continuous presence of violence in the 
Balkans for the next six centuries (from fourteenth to nineteenth): (1) the process of 
destroying the Balkan states and the former social order, launched by the Turkish 
conquests, and (2) the ebb and flow of the Ottomans wars to expand their empire into 
central Europe.  The conflicts among the powerful states of Europe permitted the 
continuation of Muslim control over the Balkans even when the Ottoman Empire itself 
was in decline.  In every period of its domination, the Ottoman Empire was able to find 
allies among the European powers who wanted to use it as a counterbalance against a 
strong opponent.  The attempts of France to exploit the Ottoman Empire, first against the 
Habsburg Empire and later (in the eighteenth century) against Russia, gave the Ottoman 
Empire a role in the European balance-of-power system.22  
The clash between the Ottoman and the Hapsburg Empires dominated life in the 
Balkans until the early twentieth century.  Considering that the current border between 
Slovenia and Croatia was the dividing line between the military frontiers of the Habsburg 
and Ottoman Empires, it is understandable that conflict was a way of life in this area.  
The Turkish defeat outside Vienna in 1683 marked the beginning of the Ottoman 
Empire’s decline in the Balkans.  Thus, under the terms of the treaty of Karlowitz (1699), 
                                          
21 Thus, the idea of the lone fighter against tyranny and the glorification of guerrilla warfare, which 
appear again in the current Balkans’ conflicts, have a long tradi tion in Balkan history.  William T. Johnsen, 
Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy , p. 14 and Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Bozic, 
Sima Cirkovic, and Milorad Ekmecic, History of Jugoslavia, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974, pp. 192-193. 
22 At this time, France attempted to unite Turkey, Poland, and Sweden into a diplomatic front outside 
the Hapsburg Empire.  Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Balkans, Englewood Cliffs, p. 34. 
10 
the Ottomans lost Croatia, Transylvania, and Slovenia. 23  Toward the end of the 
seventeenth century, Russia appeared as the great threat to the Ottoman Empire, and the 
long series of Russo-Turkish wars continued up to the end of the nineteenth century.  The 
Habsburg advances and the Russian emergence on the scene deeply affected the countries 
of the Balkans.  In the eighteenth century, commencing with the reign of Peter the Great, 
the Russian government declared itself the sponsor and protector of Balkan Orthodox 
Christianity.  The policy of encouraging Balkan revolt against Ottoman rule, inaugurated 
by Peter the Great, was carried on by his successors.  As a result, the Balkans peoples, 
being under the influence of the Habsburgs and Russians, began to be integrated to the 
contemporary European currents of thoughts.  By the last half of the eighteenth century, 
national feeling awaked throughout the Balkan countries.24  The French Revolution 
brought a new spirit to Europe and the ideology of the time provided a theoretical 
justification to Balkan nationalist activity and violence.  “The first Balkan revolution 
against the Ottoman Empire was that of the Serbs.  Serbia seethed in revolts from 1804 -
13 and again from 1815-17, winning partial autonomy.”25  It was followed by the Greek 
revolution in 1821, led by Ypsilanti, which had as the outcome an independent Greek 
kingdom.  The successful Serb and Greek revolutions and the continuous failed revolts of 
1821 in Romania and, in 1834, 1849, 1850, 1853, and 1876 in Bulgaria, which resulted in 
harsh brutality, sustained the traditional pattern of violence in the area. 26  
The revolutionary ferment in the Balkans was a mixture of the emphasis on the 
past and on the nation (inspired from the French Revolution and later on from German 
romanticism).  This ran into conflicts with the politics of the great powers, which feared 
its international implications.  The chief and permanent concern of the European powers 
was not the fate of the Balkans countries, but fear that a break up of the Ottoman Empire 
would result in an extension of Russian power.  Thus, the pragmatic policy of the Great 
Powers of supporting the status quo extended the Ottoman Empire for an extra century 
                                          
23 Leften Stavros Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1958, p. 22. 
24 Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans In Our Time, p. 70. 
25 William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy , pp. 15-16, 
Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Bozic, Sima Cirkovic, and Milorad Ekmecic, History of Jugoslavia, New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1974, pp. 266 -275. 
26 Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Bozic, Sima Cirkovic, and Milorad Ekmecic, History of Jugoslavia, pp. 266-
275, and Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Balkans, pp. 44-57. 
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after 1815.  However, three specific international situations further heightened the 
tensions as the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires continued to disintegrate.  These 
situations were: (1)  Creation of the German nation-state (1871), which dominated the 
Central Europe after 1871.  (2) The Treaty of San Stefano (March 1878).  (3) The 
Congress of Berlin (June 1878).  
With the creation of the Italian and German nation-states, the area was under the 
penetration of the new powers.27  The penetration of the new powers into the region was, 
as expected, opposed by Britain, Russia, and France.  In fact, France and Great Britain 
did not see any advantage to supporting the expansion of Austria or Russia at the expense 
of the Turks.  However, it was the great Balkan crises of 1875-1878 that culminated in 
another Russo-Turkish war and shaped the decisions of the Treaty of San Stefano and the 
Congress of Berlin.  The uprising started in Bosnia as a movement against the Ottoman 
tax-collectors, and soon spread to Bulgaria.  Serbia and Montenegro entered in the war 
against Turkey.  This occurred when the Russian Pan-Slav movement was at its height 
(1875-1878).  Thus, when the Turks were defeating the Serbs, Russian aid and volunteers 
poured into Serbia.28  England could not help Turkey against the Russia this time as she 
had done in the Crimean War because the Liberal Party made a political issue of the 
Turkish massacres against the Bulgarians, tying the hand of Disraeli’s Conservative 
government.  Thus, the Russians entered the war aware of England reluctance and having 
guaranteed Austrian benevolent neutrality by promising Bosnia and Herzegovina. 29  The 
Turks were defeated, and on 3 March 1878 in the Treaty of San Stefano, the Turks agreed 
                                          
27 During the 1870s and later, central Europe was growing up.  After the wars of unifications, 
Germany was able to become a nation-state.  Utilizing the nationalistic rallying point of a common enemy, 
France, and emphasizing the lands considered German outside the German mini-states, Otto von Bismarck 
successfully used the overwhelming public support in favor of unification to create Germany in 1871.  The 
Italian approach to a national state followed a similar path.  Thus, it was the emergence of two new powers 
that brought a revolution to European affairs.  Hagen Schulze, States, Nations, and Nationalism. From the 
Middle Ages to the Present, Blackwell Publishers Inc, 1996, pp. 220-230. 
28 The sense of missions produced by integral nationalism was common to all European Europe.  That 
applied even to Russia, whose thrust in the direction of Asia and the Indian Ocean was shadowed by the 
vision of an Empire of all the Slavs under Russian leadership.  This would serve as a barrier to Germany 
and Austria expansion to Balkan.  Hagen Schulze,  States, Nations and Nationalism from the Middle Ages to 
the Present, p. 256.   
29 Even though Russia was determined to wage war with Turkey, it was concerned about not repeating 
the mistakes of the Crimean war—to fight Turkey while having all Europeans aga inst it.  Thus, among the 
others, Russia negotiated with Austro-Hungary and promised Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Serbia and 
Montenegro would serve as a buffer zone between the Russian and Austro -Hungarian Armies.  Alan J. P. 
Tailor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918 , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957, p. 242.  
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to recognize Serbia and Rumania as independent.  The Russian took back southern 
Bessarabia, which had been awarded to the Romanians after the Russian defeat in the 
Crimean War.  Most important, the San Stefano treaty provided for the creation of a large 
autonomous Bulgaria, including most of the Macedonia.  The powers, especially 
England, were certain the new state would be a mere Russian satellite.  Thus, at the 
Congress of Berlin, the powers of Europe modified the Treaty of San S tefano, not only 
giving back to Turkey the Macedonian part, but also dividing the rest of Bulgaria into 
two provinces.30  However, the frontiers of San Stefano became an ideal after which 
several generations of Bulgarian politicians deeply yearned.  
The Berlin settlement on June 1878 left the Russians deeply disappointed at 
having fought a severe war for relatively nothing.  If the Congress was a defeat for 
Russia, neither it was a complete success for Austria -Hungary (the Hapsburg mandate 
over Bosnia and Herzegovina angered Serbia and Montenegro and provoked the crises of 
1908 and 1914), nor for Great Britain (Turkey was ceased as a Great Power and, 
therefore, a neutral barrier between Russia and Great Britain was eliminated). 31  Thus the 
Congress of Berlin, from a macro perspective, exposed the Balkans as a central arena for 
Great Power competition in Europe.   
The Congress of Berlin closed the first phase of the Balkan national liberation.  
Four states —Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria—were established.  However,  each of them 
had further territorial aims and, therefore, the Congress settlement considerably increased 
the antagonism and hostility between the Balkan peoples.  The Serbs were deeply 
opposed to the Habsburg mandate over Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Rom ania felt 
cheated at giving up southern Bessarabia.  Even though Serbia and Montenegro 
maintained their independence, they lost territories gained in the Treaty of San Stefano.  
The Berlin settlement awarded to Montenegro substantial areas whose population  was in 
                                          
30 The Russians were not able to fight another war.  This was a great element which England exploited 
to the fullest. Thus, Russia agreed to give up “Big Bulgaria of San Stefano”, Alan J. P . Tailor, The Struggle 
for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918 , p. 249. 
31 In the nineteenth century, Britain had been the chief supporter of the Ottoman Empire and the main 
opponent of Balkan Nationalism, Ibid, pp. 252 -3. 
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fact Albanian.32  Thus, the Congress of Berlin, from a micro perspective, left a legacy of 
dissatisfaction throughout the Balkan region. 
In sum, even though the Congress of Berlin was followed by thirty-four years of 
peace for the major part of Europe, for the Balkans the period after the Congress was 
characterized by further tensions and conflicts.33  According to the noted European 
historian Carlton J. H. Hayes, “If before 1878 the ‘Eastern Question’ concerned one ‘sick 
man’, after 1878 it involved a half-dozen maniacs.  For the Congress of Berlin drove the 
Balkan peoples mad”34  
4. The Balkans before World War I  
Russia and Austria-Hungary were the great powers most directly involved in the 
area.  The increasing competition between Austro-Hungary and Russia for the 
domination of the Balkans countries characterized the decade prior to the First World 
War.  The Austrian intention to build a railroad through Novipazar, which would have 
secured to the Monarchy a channel running between Serbia and Montenegr o, incited the 
Russians to project a railroad running from Danube to Adriatic.  Even though nothing 
was realized in reality, these developments increased Balkan tensions. 35  
Taking into consideration that the Habsburg Monarchy was focused on its 
domestic problems and Russia at the end of nineteenth century was looking toward the 
Far East, it was in the interest of both governments to reach an understanding for 
maintaining the status quo in the area.  In April 1897, Franz Josef and Nicholas II 
therefore reached an agreement to keep under control the Macedonian question.36  
However, the increasing nationalist passions to free the region from the Ottoman control, 
and their desire for outside intervention, in October 1903 obligated Franz Josef and 
Nicholas II to meet at Mürzteg.  They approved a program that offered, among the others, 
                                          
32 William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy , p. 17. 
33 An unsuccessful revolt racked Albania in 1880, the war between Serbia and Bulgaria in 1885, and 
the war between Turkey and Greece in 1987.         
34 Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Generation of Materialism, 1871 -1900, New York: Harper, 1941, p. 33. 
35 Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans In Our Time, p. 89. 
36 In the late nineteenth century, five states had demands toward Macedonia —Bulgaria, Albania, 
Greece, Romania, and Serbia.  Thus, Macedonia was an exploiting point.  Barbara Jelavich, History of the 
Balkans, Vol. II, Twentieth Century , New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 90 - 94. 
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a gendarmerie under great-powers control.  “Russian, Austrian, French, Italian, and 
British zones were created, and the Germans took over the task of inspection of the 
schools.”37  Thus, after 1903 the remaining area of the Ottoman Empire in Europe 
became not only a scene with increasing nationalist spirit and rivalry of the liberated 
nationalities, but also the subject of Great Power’s intervention to prevent peace. 38  
In the key year 1908, the Young Turk revolution took place in the region, which 
led to a very short period of good feelings between the Turks and the countries under 
their subject.  When the Young Turks showed their nationalist tendency, nationalist 
passions of the Balkans’ countries, still under their domination, reached a fever peach.  
Having secured for the Germany’s backing, the Austrian Monarchy took advantage of the 
crises to annex the provinces of the Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Experiencing increasing 
difficulty in keeping pro-Serbian agitation in the territories under control, and being 
strongly backed by Germany, Austria declared its annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
on 5 October 1905.  Thus, Austria strengthened her position in the Balkans without 
providing for Russia any compensation.  Besides the political considerations, the military 
situation allowed Austria to annex the two provinces without having a diplomatic 
consensus in Europe.  
“The conditions of the Russian army left St. Petersburg completely incapable of 
deterring any Austria-Hungarian action backed by Germany.”39  Russia also was obliged 
to back down because the French and British were unwilling to plunge into a war for the 
sake of Serbia.  The Paris linked the financial loan to Russian railway construction with 
the requirement that Russia not to go in war in 1909.40  Thus, in the last weak of March, 
the Russian government recognized the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
From the Austrian perspective, this act would end Serbs dreams of adding the two 
provinces to their national state.  In fact, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
                                          
37 Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans In Our Time, p. 88. 
38 The activities of the terrorist organizations as “Unions of Death” in Serbia  or the Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Committee infinitely complicated the situation in the region.  Charles Jelavich 
and Barbara Jelavich, The Balkans, Englewood Cliffs, p. 76, and Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, 
Vol. II, p. 95.  
39 Ibid, p. 116. 
40 Ibid, pp. 119-120. 
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place of solving the South Slav problem aggravated it more.  Austria had great 
difficulties in ruling these two provinces because the Slavs were opposed to the 
annexation.  
Humiliated in the Bosnian case, Russia was strongly engaged to establish a front 
of the Balkans’ countries against the Habsburg Monarchy.  In fact, the Russia’s intend 
was not the final partition of the Ottoman’s remaining lands in the region.  However, the 
Balkans countries, being encouraged from Bulgaria full independence (the Austrian 
Monarchy arranged that at the same time of the Bosnia annexation Prince Ferdinand of 
Bulgaria would proclaim his full independence from Turkey), concluded a series of 
agreement that were beyond the Russian’s control.41  Even though the Russian and 
Habsburg Monarchy, acting for all of the powers, wanted to prevent the war, their 
intervention came too late.42  Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro, for the first time 
linked in an alliance, which at the core had their ambitions to occupy portions of the 
helpless Macedonia, launched a military action against the Ottoman Empire in the early 
autumn of 1912.  Considering that the Ottoman military power had been weakened by t he 
domestic political controversies and the financial problems, the victory over the Ottoman 
army was achieved relatively easy.43  However, the main problem faced by the coalition 
was not to defeat the weak Ottoman Empire, but that of drawing borders betwee n each 
others. 
Possessing aspiration with relation to territories that could be satisfied only at the 
expense of the others, the victorious allies soon fell in an internal strife over the division 
of Macedonia and Albania.  Having grievance with Greeks over the owning of Salonica, 
which was occupied by Greece, and facing the Serb’s insistence of keeping theirs share 
over Macedonia, Bulgaria attacked Greece and Serbia.  Thus, the Balkan League 
collapsed and the war broke among the allies in June 1913.  Being  supported by 
                                          
41 It was a time when powerful forces of nationalism were mixed with the dreams of new glories that 
shaped the leadership’s minds of the newly established Balkan countries.  Moreover, the political leaders of 
the newly created Balkan states were now commencing to take issues into their hands.  They concluded war 
agreements against the Ottoman Empire.  George F. Kennan, At a Century’s Ending, W. W. Norton & 
London, 1997, pp. 192-193.  
42 The Austro-Russian note was presented on the same day when Montenegro declared war on Turkey. 
Alan J. P. Tailor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918, p. 490. 
43 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Vol. II,  pp. 97-8. 
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Ottomans and Romania, Greeks and Serbs were able to defeat Bulgaria. The Treaty of 
Bucharest of August 1913 did not satisfy the requirements of the main Western Balkans’ 
countries.  Bulgaria retained only a part of Macedonia, while Greece and  Serbs did not 
completely receive what they wanted from Macedonia.  Establishing Albanian 
independence, the great powers also left unsatisfied nationalist expectations in this area 
of the Greeks and Serbs.44  Thus, unsatisfied countries would exploit the earliest 
opportunity to readdress their aspiration. 
5. World War1 
With the Ottoman Empire out of the Balkans, the nationalist issues were focused 
on the northern part of the region.  The main questions were related to the relationships of 
the Slavic inhabitants (the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) of the Dual Monarchy with both 
the Monarchy itself and the Serbian state.  More problematic were Serbian nationalists, 
who inspired from the German and Italian examples wanted their kingdom to be “the 
Piedmont of the Balkans.”  Thus, the greater Serbian goal was the acquisitions of lands 
that at some time had been under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox church.  As a 
model for fevering nationalist passions served the Serbian medieval Empire of Stephen 
Dusan.  Serbian national sentiment produced in the summer of 1914 the assassination of 
Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Habsburg throne. 45  Being under the conditions of 
increasing interdependence, the alliance system, which kept Europe out of the war, had 
forced it into war.46  In the sum, Germany mobilized to back the Austrians, and the 
Russians mobilized to back the Serbs.  In means that the Great Powers were in war: 
                                          
44 The Serbs occupied all the northern parts of Albanian and reached the Adriatic at Durazzo.  
Calculating that a Serbian port in Adriatic would in fact be a Russian port, both Austria and Italy 
irreconcilably opposed the Serbian outlet in Adriatic.  Thus, they both strongly engaged in the creation of 
the Albanian state.  The conference of ambassadors held under the presidency of the British foreign 
secretary in London in December 1912 established an independent Albanian state.  The great problem of 
the division of Macedonia remained open.  Thus, the great powers imposed a settlem ent that left nationalist 
expectations unfulfilled.  Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 93, and Alan J. P. Tailor, The 
Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918 , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. 494-498.  See 
also, Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Vol. II, pp. 99- 100. 
45 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Vol. II, pp. 108-113, and Charles Jelavich and Barbara 
Jelavich, The Balkans, pp. 77-80. 
46 Being alone after the Morocco crises, Germany had no other choice but to prov ide a blank check to 
Austro-Hungary.  On the other hand, the aggressive attitude of the pre -war Germany increased cooperation 
between the Entente governments.  Moreover, German and Austro -Hungarian decision makers in 1914 had 
arguments in order to believe that fighting a preventive war was necessary because the future would bring 
for them far worse circumstances.  
17 
Russia, France, and Great Britain (including the United States and Italy) against 
Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Turkey.47 
The consequences of the World War 1, related directly with our topic, are as 
following: 
First, increasing hatred between Balkan peoples as a consequence of their 
divisions, during the war, in different camps: Bulgarian and Turkish suppor t for Central 
Powers, and Serbian (a belligerent country) and Greek support for the Allies only 
sharpened centuries old hostilities.48 
Second, suffering a high cost in economic destruction and human distress during 
the war, the Balkan countries faced a demographic disaster and economic decline after 
the war.49  In addition, considering the fact that the Balkan countries perceived the peace 
settlements imposed and unjust, it is understandable that the old resentments were 
fostered further on.  
6. The Balkan States Between the Wars  
Considering the above consequences, it is clear that the inter -war years were very 
harsh for the Balkan peoples.  The peace settlements in no way settled the national 
conflicts in the region.  Taking into consideration that the border  areas in the region were 
too intermixed, it is understandable the impossibility of dividing the Balkan people on 
purely national lines.  The principle of self determination was very good for the defeated 
states as a possibility to save them from greater loses while the historic and strategic 
claims were very good for the victorious as a possibility to gain more.  Thus, President 
Wilson’s ideas of self -determination in drawing the national borders clashed with those 
who wished to use the peace settlement as  a possibility to guarantee their future 
dominance.  
                                          
47 Under the influence of the war minister, who was well -known as pro-German, the Turkish 
government signed a secret alliance with Germany on Augus t 2, 1914, one day before Germany declared 
war on France. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Vol. II, p. 116. 
48 Murderous Macedonian and Montenegro occupation from Bulgarian increased the Serbian existing 
hatred of their eastern neighbor.  Leften St avros Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, pp. 648-650. 
49 Serbia suffered approximately 600,000 civilian casualties (2.5 times, per capita, the casualties of 
France and 3.0 times that of Britain.  Montenegro lost almost 63,000 people, or approximately 25 pe rcent 
of the prewar population.  Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Bozic, Sima Cirkovic, and Milorad Ekmecic, History of 
Yugoslavia, pp. 501-502, and Leften Stavros Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, New York: Rinehart and 
Co., Inc., 1958, pp. 632-633. 
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Under these circumstances, at Versailles the peace settlements created the 
Yugoslav states—to the former Serbia Kingdom were added Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia -
Herzegovina, and Vojvodina (former Austro -Hungarian possessions).  Thus, “to a greater 
extent Yugoslavia was the result of the general political and social forces at work in 
Europe, which culminated in the conflagration of World War I, and resulted …in the 
disintegration of … the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.”50  However, in Yugoslavia, the 
multiethnic nation-state proved to be a harsh experiment.  Throughout the interwar 
period, the citizens of Yugoslavia considered themselves first as Serbs, Croats, 
Macedonians, or Slovenes.  Thus, within the country the sharp divisions were clearly 
shown in all quarrels over the organization and functioning of government. 51  Moreover, 
the annexation of some territories of Dalmatia (with predominantly Croat and Slovene 
population) to Italy aggravated the post war relations between Italy and the newly created 
large state.  
Romania was the second favored nation of the Treaty of Versailles.  The decline 
of Austro-Hungary and Russia (her two neighbors) created for Romania the possibility to 
double its size, becoming the largest state in the region after the war.52  
Greece, despite the fact that she was in the victors’ camp, received very little in 
comparison with her claims.  Greeks’ attempt to gain by force a larger share resulted in a 
national tragedy.  Thus, even though the World War ended in November 1918, for the 
region the conflict lasted further on with the Greco-Turkish War of 1921-22.  Greece was 
defeated losing not only territory but also was compelled to receive almost 1,3 million 
Greek refugees.53    
                                          
50 Jozo Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia , Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1955, p. 3. 
51 Jugoslavism never won broad popular support and remained mainly an intellectual and literal 
concept, because the differences in the historical experience between the Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, and 
Slovenes were very acute.  
A Montenegrin member of the Radical party shot the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Stjepan 
Radic, in 1928, in the assembly.  This situation gave King Alexander the possi bility to gather all the power 
of the state in his hands and thus established a royal dictatorship.  Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, 
The Balkans, p. 96. 
52 Ibid, p. 82. 
53 Considering the fact that Greek population at that time was about 4,5 million, it is clear that Greece 
suffered a national disaster. Ibid, p. 82.  
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Trying to control ethnic tensions by imposing ethnic partition, Greek and Turkey 
agreed, in the early 1929s, to exchange more than a million peoples as a solution for 
consolidating their nation-states.  In fact, this exchange did not solve the problem because 
approximately 100,000 ethnic Greeks remained in Constantinople and for keeping the 
balance; the Turkish government left almost 100,000 Turks in western Thrace.  
Therefore, the roots of ethnic conflicts remained there generating continuous quarrels 
over the problems of treating the minorities.54 
As far as Albania and Bulgaria is concerned, although they had their own national 
states, they were not satisfied with the borders.  Being in the losing side, Bulgaria lost 
western Thrace and some areas along the Yugoslav frontier s while Albania saw half of 
her population remain under Yugoslavia control.  In sum, during the years after the war, 
further tensions and new problems between the Balkan countries were created.  The 
Balkan governments, all in one manner or another, had to deal with national issues 
including not only the handling of minorities, but also the integration of co-nationals in 
the new territories.55  The Great Depression of 1930s and the establishment of the 
National Socialist regime in Germany (1933) deeply affected the internal politics of the 
Balkan states.  “Deprived of other markets by the world economic crises, the Balkan 
states found themselves increasingly drawn toward Germany.”56  This largely replaced 
Ottoman or Habsburg authoritarianism with national dicta torships increasing ethnic and 
religious discrimination. 
7. World War II 
The beginning of World War II revived all national problems of Western Balkans 
countries.  Hitler’s policies toward the Soviet Union required not only a secure southern 
flank, but their resources, as well.  Therefore, before attacking the Soviets, the Nazis 
                                          
54 Leften Stavros Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1958, p. 
590, and William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy , Strategic 
Studies Institute, 1995, p. 22.  
55 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Vol. II, p. 191. 
56 Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Balkans, p. 101.  
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bolstered their relationship with Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.57  On the other hand, 
the Italian failure to occupy Greece, forced Hitler to turn attention toward the Balkan 
front.  The Allied intervention (British occupied Corfu) and the failure of Yugoslav 
government to completely fulfill the German’s demand compelled Hitler to invade both 
Greece and Yugoslavia in April 1941.58  
By the summer of 1941, when German armies began their  attack against the 
Soviet Union, all of the Balkan states were involve in hostilities: Romania and Bulgaria 
were Axis allies while Albania, Greece, and Yugoslavia were under German occupation.  
Punishing the Western inclination of Serbia, the Nazis dismembered Yugoslavia in favor 
of a Greater Croatia, Greater Albania, and a Greater Bulgaria.  These nationalist 
sentiments erupted in bloody conflicts.  It has been estimated that as many as 350,000 
Serbs were killed at this time. 59  Thus, the Balkan countries suffered terribly during the 
war years.  It is understandable that the countries that were under German harsh 
occupation suffered more.  The active resistance movements organized especially by 
partisans in Yugoslavia and Greece increased the German reprisals.  For instance, 
Yugoslavia suffered 1.7 million dead out of a population of 16 million. 60  
Despite the idealistic aspects of partisans’ movements, they had also their harsh 
side, which was further fostered by ethnic and religious divisions.  Enemies, bes ides 
foreign occupiers, were treated with ruthlessness and cruelty.  These attitudes were to be 
carried over into the post war regimes and to be applied toward any political opposition.  
8. Post-World War II 
The years immediately following World War II (as the Years after World War I) 
did not see an end to conflicts in Western Balkans countries.  Yugoslavia was involved in 
                                          
57 Based on the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, the Soviet Union took Bessarabia and northern 
Bukovina.  Being the case, Bulgaria presented its claims to Rumanians lands.  Acting as arbiter, Germany, 
in the Vienna Award of 1940, gave southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria.  Thus, Romania was forced to cooperate 
with Berlin as the only possibility to save the rest of the territory.  Ibid, p. 102.  
58 In March 1941, the Yugoslav government signed a pact with Germany according to which 
Yugoslavia was to provide military assistance to Germany in return for the future position of territory in 
Greek Macedonia.  Having both public and secret sections, the pact generated rumors and provoked an 
immediate reaction in Belgrade.  A military coup took over the government.  Barbara Jelavich, History of 
the Balkans, Vol. II, pp. 235-238. 
59 Ibid, p. 265. 
60 Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Bozic, Sima Cirkovic, and Milorad Ekmecic, History of Jugoslavia, p. 415. 
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the civil war until 1947, when Tito’s Communist regimes successfully took over the 
complete control of violence.  The Greek civil war las ted from 1946 to 1949.  The United 
States aid helped the victory of government and left Greece out of Soviet influence.  
Thus, with the Communist party in power in Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and 
Albania, the Communist model of state, forming a solid and repressive dictatorship, 
achieved to suspend historical animation.  Using Stalin’s models of secret police and 
concentration camps, the Communist dictators in the Balkan countries were able to 
suppress all forms of ethnic nationalism.  However, the bitte r memories of ethnic 
conflicts were secretly passed from parents to children.  This ‘buried’ legacy burst into 
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III. THE HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF CONFLICT 
A nation is a people united by a common dislike of its neighbors and by a 
common mistake about its origin  
George Brook61 
 
The Balkans is a mosaic of peoples that differentiate themselves by ethnic origin, 
religion, language, and culture.  The richness of different ethnic, religious, linguistic, 
cultural, and economical factors that Balkans is endowed with, has been an incubator for 
numerous conflicts. Most of them have their distant historical background, and have 
become an inseparable part of national determinations and are to large extent influencing 
present behaviour of particular states. The latest proof has been NATO air strikes (1999) 
against Serbia because of Serbian repression and ethnic cleansing against the ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo.  The expulsion of over a million of the Albanian population from 
their lands by the Serb army and paramilitary forces jeopardized the stability of the whole 
Western Balkans.  Thus, analizing the roots of conflicts in the Balkan is important not 
only for putting the right diaognose about the nature of conflicts, but also for defining the 
right reccomendations for the future.  
Even though within the Balkans, ethnic origin, language, culture, and religion are 
too closely tangled to be addressed independently, having a better understanding of these 
complex issues requires separate investigation. Thus, in this chapter I will examine the 
ethnic, religion, language, and culture divisions in the Balkans.  
A. ETHNIC DIVISIONS 
If one looks at an ethnic map of Europe, he is struck by a sharp discrepancy 
between western and eastern states.  The relative homogeneity of ethnic groups is 
characteristic (beside Britain) for western states, while the relative heterogeneity of ethnic 
groups is characteristic for eastern states, especially the Western Balkans.  The main 
characteristic of all the countries included in the Western Balkans is that they are host -
states of sizable ethnic minorities concentrated in border regions with neighboring kin -
                                          
61 Cited in Uri Ra’anan et al., eds. , State and Nations in Multi-Ethnic Societies, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1991, p. 54.  
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states.  Indeed, some 20 people s coexist there, who speak numerous languages and 
practice three principal religions: Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam.62  
The last wave of migrations, which broke over the Balkans by the end of the 9th 
century largely, constituted ethnic divisions in the region.  However, even at this early 
time, no ethnically pure groups remained in the region because a band of Slavic speaking 
peoples separated the Albanian and Greeks in the south from Romanians in the north. 63 
The ebb and flow of Ottoman Empire considerably increased ethnic mixture in the 
region.  With the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, in the fourteenth century, the Serbs 
were pushed north and west.  Suffering under the Ottoman domination had from the 
beginning led large numbers of Serbs to migrate and sizable groups settled in southern 
Hungary, western Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia. 64  With the contraction of the Ottoman 
Empire, sizable part of the displaced populations migrated southward once again.  Thus, 
from the ethnic standpoint, the result of the Ottoman rule in the region was the creation of 
a patchwork ethnic composition that has remained up to the present days.   
The repressive character of the Ottoman Empire, and the ethnic patchwork posed 
considerable barriers to the rise of Risorgimento nationalism and, therefore, hindering the 
development of unifying nationalist movements.  However, unable to consolidate around 
a single unifying nation, ethnic groups coalesced around their language and religion and 
embraced a pattern of nationalism which was inspired by historical myths.  
Each of the Balkan states had its period of grandeur, coinciding with its maximum 
occupation of territory.  These expansions—through wars or as rewards of major 
powers—occurred in different historical periods.65  Thus, Albanians experienced the 
great prosperity during the Roman times.  The Slavic advance deeply affected the 
                                          
62 Milica Zarkovic Bookman, Economic Decline and Nationalism in the Balkans, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994, pp. 38-39.  
63 The influx of Slavic immigrants, which started in the six -century, altered the ethnic character of the 
indigenous populations through a massive admixture of new-culture bearing.  Anthony D. Smith, The 
Ethnic Origins of Nations,  Blackwell, Oxford UK & Cambridge USA, 1987, p. 96, and Charles Jelavich 
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64 Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans In Our Time, p. 64, and William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the 
Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy, p. 29.  
65 As we have seen in Chapter II, in the Balkans, in the nineteenth century, boundary changes occurred 
because of the actions of the great powers, which traded these territories as if they  were pawns.  
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Albanians lands.66  Macedonians have looked at the times of Philip II and Alexander III 
(pre-medieval period), when the kingdom of Macedon stretched to Persia  and to 
Mediterranean.67  Croats based their national claims to the Pacta Conventa (1102) that 
established a Croatian state, which included the Northwest corner of the Balkans. 68  
Bulgarians have looked to the Empire of Tsar Asen II (medieval times), who str etched 
Bulgaria from the Adriatic to the Black Seas.  Serbs have reached the height of their 
glory during the reign of Tsar Dusan (fourteenth century), when Serbia included part of 
Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and northern Greece, and its borders extend ed from 
the Adriatic to the Aegean Sea and to the gates of Constantinople. 69  Romania entered the 
nineteenth century as a series of principalities, and reached its “glory” days in modern 
times.  After the Crimean War (1854), these principalities were unifie d and the modern 
Romanian state was born.70  
Taking into consideration that since their independence in the nineteenth century 
the Balkan countries have based their stances or actions on what happened in the pre-
Turkish period or beyond, it is clear that the reference to the historical myths and to the 
establishment of independent kingdoms is not mere historical footnote.  During the 
conflicts of the last decade, many ethnic groups in the region used historical myths and 
claims to justify their actions and territorial demands.  
The above historical review clearly indicates that most nations in the region have 
competed for an intermingling territory, and here it stands a great cause of perpetual 
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conflicts.71  Thus, the movements and the conflicts in the region are inspired and caused 
form the ethno-nationalism, which derives from the ethno-territorial concept.72  
With the decline of Ottoman Empire73 in the region, the ethno-nationalism 
reached the momentum.  Indeed, Great Powers’ concern over the separation of Ottoman 
ruins oftentimes suspended nationalist inspirations.  Furthermore, the practical 
impossibility to bring all the segments of an ethnic group under one nation only created a 
cycle of unsolved remaining conflicts which the fires of ethno-nationalism brought 
inevitably and periodically on the scene.  
The starting point for the ethnically based territorial disputes between Serbs and 
Albanians is the Treaty of Bucharest of August 1913, which established the independent 
state of Albania.  The great victors were Serbia and Greece because large parts of 
northern, eastern and southern Albania went to Serbia and Greece. 74  As a result, over 
half of the Albanian population was left outside the borders of the new state of Albania.  
This situation has been preserved t o the present day.75 
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Revival, London: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 450.  
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but as a tool to be used in larger European concerns.  Alan Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, pp. 
62-82. 
74 The ancestors of Albanians, the Dardanians, lived in Kosovo before Slav invasions of the sixth 
century.  The classical Serbian view pretends that the people who lived in Kosovo were overwhelmingly 
Serbs until the invasion of Ottoman Empire and, therefore, the land would be that much stronger.  Tim 
Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, Yale Universit y Press, 2000, p. 2.  
75 With the escalation of violence first in Kosovo (1999) and actually in Macedonia, it becomes even 
more evident that the Albanian national question could present a greater and longer -term threat to stability 
in the Western Balkans than Bosnia 
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Participation of various ethnic groups in different camps in the World War I 
increased ethnic hatred.  Thus, Serbia, Greece, and Romania fought on the side of the 
Allies, while the Croats, Bulgarians and Slovenians supported the Central Powers.  
During the war, Croats collected Serbs and Muslim Slavs (Bosnians) into concentration 
camps, where tens of thousands of them died, mainly through disease and neglect.76  
These events shed light for a better understanding of the war between Croats and Serbs in 
the middle of 1990s.  
On the other hand, the creation of Yugoslavia following World War I offers a 
brilliant example of the failure to fulfill ethno-nationalist claims.  In fact, the fear of 
Italian expansion to the South Slavs territory forced them to unite Serbia.  Thus, it was 
the threat from abroad that forced the leaders of the South Slavs to negotiate the 
unification with Serbia.77  
In the inter-war period, Albanians from Kosovo and western Macedonia were 
subject to Serbian rule that can be characterized by oppression and educational-cultural 
marginalization.  Moreover, the Serbs tried to carry out territorial ethnic restructuring 
through Serb colonization and through an oppressive treatment to force Albanians to 
emigrate.  Because of this policy, in the years 1918-1941, some 70,000 colonists were 
brought to Kosovo and around 150,000 Albanians emigrated mainly in Turkey. 78  
However, the Albanians under the Serb rule never gave up their resistance against 
oppression.  The kacak resistance founded in 1918 the Committee for the National 
Defense of Kosovo, which became known as Kosovo Committee.  Just like the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), it smuggled arms across the borders with Albania and 
coordinated the resistance of the Albanian Population in  Yugoslavia.  
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The World War II was the first test proved that Yugoslavia, as a multiethnic 
nation-state, was a difficult experiment.  Taking into consideration the strategic location 
of Yugoslavia and her Western preference, the Nazis —in order to keep order in this state 
and to balance and punish its Western leaning—dismembered the country in favor of a 
Greater Croatia, Greater Albania, and Greater Bulgaria. 79  Moreover, during the war, 
Hitler undertook large-scale measures to carry out his grandiose plan of Germanizing 
various Yugoslav peoples.  According to this plan, the Nazis deported about 40,000 
Slovenes, and approximately 200,000 Serbs and Slovenes left on their own to escape the 
fate that would otherwise have awaited them.80  Inspired from the Hitler’s ideology of 
exterminating, the Croats and Bulgarians carry out mass expulsions of outside elements 
living in their areas.  Thus, the Bulgarians realized mass exclusions of Serbs in 
Macedonia and presented large numbers of Bulgarians colonists in the area.   
From the ethnics’ standpoint, the most controversial political creation of this 
period was the independent state of Croatia.  Including the territories of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina considerably complicated the ethnic bases of the state.  “Of its 6.5 million  
inhabitants, only 3.4 million were Croatian; there were also 1.9 million Orthodox Serbs, 
700,000 million Muslims, 150,000 Germans, 18,000 Jews, and some Italians.”81  
Although a German military command was established in Zagreb, Hitler (occupied with 
the Eastern campaign preparations) let Mussolini decide who would run the government.  
The Italian dictator naturally chose Ante Pavelic, the Ustasa leader, who with the 
Mussolini support had created its political movement in 1929.82  
The implementation of the exterminating policy, in a state with ethnic 
composition as Croatia, ended in bloody conflicts.  Once the Ustasi campaign began, as 
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early as late April 1941, Serbs under Colomel Drazha Mihailovic organized their 
resistance.  Mihailovic called his forces the Chetnik  because this term recalled to memory 
similar groups that had fought against Ottoman rule. 83  Even though the main concern of 
Mihailovic and the Chetniks was to build up a great Serbia or as it was sometimes called, 
a Serbian unit within a great Yugoslavia, the Chetnik movement had no post war solution 
of the national question to offer the other ethnic groups of Yugoslavia.  Considering that 
the main thought of the Chetnik  leaders was to bring back what had been lost, it is 
understandable that the war between the Ustasi and the Chetniks had no room for 
compromise and the outright murder became commonplace.84  
The failure of Hitler to finish quickly his campaign against the Soviet Union gave 
the possibility the Axis-occupied regions to organize their partisan movements.  In the 
case of Yugoslavia, the Communist Party, illegal for years under the royal government, 
took the lead, and the general secretary of the Party Josip Broz Tito, nicknamed Tito, 
commanded the Party’s resistance activities.  Even though both the Partisans and the 
Chetniks had the same objective of expelling the enemy, they failed to work together.  
The most serious disagreement between the Partisans and the Chetniks was the division 
over the future of Yugoslavia.  Appealing strictly only to the Serbs, the Chetnik’s 
program had no attraction for the Croats, Albanians, Macedonians, Slovenes, and 
Bosnians.  On the contrary, the Partisan’s program was to defend the equal rights of all 
the constituent nationalities of the Yugoslav state.  Fur thermore, the brutal German 
reprisals against the actions of resistant movement forced the Chetnics to believe that 
German reprisals against guerrilla warfare would be so terrible as to threaten the Serb 
people with extinction.  Therefore, the Chetnics began to feel that the Partisans, with their 
insistence on provoking reprisals, were the greatest danger.  A three -side war thus 
developed between the Chetnics, the Partisans, and the Ustasi.  
The civil and ethnic war quickly extended further than Croatian-Serbian warfare 
because both sides settled old scores with the Muslim community.  Emphasizing the 
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slogan “Serbs above all”, the Chetniks pushed the Serbs to fight the Croats and Muslims.  
This policy forced Muslims to join the Croats in the uprising against the Serbs.  Thus, the 
ethnic and civil war dressed with the religious aspects won another dimension infinitely 
complicating the problems of Yugoslavia, already difficult beyond human 
understanding.85 
The costs of this complex (civil-ethnic -religious) war were overwhelming.  It has 
still not been estimated how many Serbs were killed in Croatia.  Some authors claim that 
the number of victims was 300,000; others put the figure at 500,000 at least.  However, 
the Serbs were not the only victims.  Muslims also suf fered largely.  Within Bosnia-
Herzegovina about 8 percent of the pre-war population perished.86  Thus, the ethnic 
carnage in Bosnia took more lives than the fight against foreign occupiers or the conflicts 
of the 1990s.  
Even though the Croatian casualties were less than Serbs, they were considerable.  
The bloodiest episode involved the fate of the Croatian supporters of the Ustasi regime.  
Over 100,000 of these people decided to surrender to the British army.  Because of an 
inter-Allied agreement that prisoners were to be sending back to the government against 
which they had fought, the British gave this people back to the Partisans.  Within six 
weeks the majority of these people died.87  
Even the civil war, as we have seen, caused a significant number of cas ualties, it 
did not solve the ethnic issues.  The final decision on the territorial disposition of Western 
Balkans affairs at the and of the World War II, as in the past, depended not on the 
President Wilson’s ideas of self determination but upon the relations and the interests of 
the great powers.  
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Trying to prevent complete Soviet domination of the Balkans, the British Prime 
Minister, Churchill sought to make some kind of an arrangement with Stalin. 88  Having 
no support from the United States, they agreed to replace the percentage agreement with 
the Yalta Declaration.  Referring the future political order in the Balkans the text of the 
Declaration proclaimed “the right of all people to choose the form of government under 
which they will live” and “the restoration of sovereign rights and self -government to 
those people who have been forcibly deprived of them. “ 89  Even though Stalin signed the 
Declaration, his aim for the establishment of purely Communist regimes throughout the 
western Balkans required methods  other than “the right of people to choose the form of 
government”. Thus, the Balkan countries emerged from World War II with different 
political institutions and a unified foreign policy managed and controlled by the Soviet 
Union.  
Taking into considerations that the Communist regimes were supplied with an 
anti-national bent, it is understandable that their solid and repressive dictatorship 
suppressed all forms of ethnic -nationalism.  After World War II, an armed revolt of the 
Albanian Kosovars who refused to go back to Yugoslavia was suppressed and Kosovo, in 
fact, was again part of Serbia, although by name it was an autonomous region.  The Serb 
oppression achieved the climax during the time when the Ministry of interior and secret 
service were in the hands of Alexandar Rankovic.90  Believing in traditional old-style 
repression methods, Rankovic gave to Serbs all key positions in Kosovo.  Albanian 
frustration erupted in the 1968 demonstrations that were put down with the use of force.  
Since then, however, steps were taken to improve the status of Kosovo, a process that 
fully crystallized in the Federal Constitution of 1974.  
Considering the explosive character of the ethnic issues, Tito attempted to 
establish internal borders based on national bases.  “Because of the mixed population, it 
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would have been impossible to create purely national republics….  Yet the republics were 
defined as sovereign homelands of sovereign nations: Croatia of Croats, Serbia of Serbs, 
and so on.”91  This enterprise, established to protect ethnic minorities in other republics, 
created the precedent of allowing the minorities living within a republic to consider 
themselves part of their nation.92  Thus, the ethnic passions obliged Tito to alternate 
methods.  On one hand, he provided greater local autonomy, through constitutional 
changes as in 1953, 1962, and 1974, and on the other, he carried out purges in the cases 
of strong nationalism.  
Yugoslavian’s Communists believed that humanity could create a new human 
being.  They thought that the ethnic differences were negligible, since they were 
principally based on historical memories and religion, both belonged to the past.  Thus, 
the Communists were correct in the perception of differences among different ethnic 
groups as primarily rooted in history.  They were mistaken in thinking that because of 
this they had no future.  In fact, the ethnic passions that obliged Tito to reshuffle his 
policy, and to grant greater local autonomy as he did in 1953, 1962, and 1974.  
According to the Constitution of 1974, Kosovo was proclaimed an Autonomous 
Province with a representative status in the Federation almost equal to that of the 
constituent republics.  Although, de jure, Kosovo acquired status close to the other 
republics within Yugoslavia, de facto, the province was formally within Serbia and had 
no right to self-determination.  However, the power was by now considerably in the 
hands of Albanian (Kosovar) Communists.  The constitution resulted in increased 
Albanian political control of Kosovo.  Thus,  besides the armed forces and foreign 
relations, the local state apparatus moved into the hands of Albanian Kosovars. 93 
The Constitution of 1974 became a turning point in the relations between Serbs 
and Albanians.  In the opinion of Serbs, the constitution had encouraged the autonomous 
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province of Kosovo to behave as a federative unit.  However, considering themselves as 
the third largest national group in Yugoslavia (after the Serbs and Croats), Albanian 
Kosovars shared a strong opinion that the constitutio n gave them fewer rights than they 
deserved.94  Thus, the dissatisfaction of Albanians with an Autonomous Province status 
and their refusal of the Serbs’ legitimacy in the province lie at the core of the conflict 
between the two sides. 
In the case of Romania, an historical survey can quite clearly show that the main 
area of the ethnically based territorial disputes with Hungary was Transylvania.  As in the 
case of the ethnic disputes between Albania and Serbia, Romanians claim that they were 
the original inhabitants of Transylvania.  On the other hand, Hungarians insist that the 
area was unoccupied when their antecedents arrived in the 10-th century.  Thus, 
Transylvania has “periodically” moved from Romanian rule to Hungarian and back 
Among these moves the most “prominent” was the one at the end of the Great War when, 
as Austro-Hungary disintegrated in 1918, Romania being in the Allies’ side entered her 
armies in Transylvania, and her possession of the province was confirmed at the 
Versailles Peace Conference.95  Therefore, after 1919, Romanians possessed 
administrative and political positions, and Romanian became the official language of the 
region.  Nevertheless, Hungarians were able to keep their schools, churches, and 
newspapers.  
As far as the policies of Romanian communists are concerned, they were in tune 
with the Stalinist model for national self -determination.  After World War II - in the early 
fifties – they granted to the Hungarian minority broad minority rights.  The Romanian 
state established a Hungarian Autonomous District in Transylvania.  In this district, the 
Hungarian was put on a par with the official Romanian language, and a system of 
schools, universities, and cultural institutions (under Romanian state financial 
responsibility) were set up. Despite these attempts and many fine statements about the 
equality of the citizens, the fact remained that the Romanian officials did not trust the 
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Hungarian minority, whose national ties were obviously still with the Hungarian state. 96  
Thus, in 1968 the Autonomous Region ceased to exist, Hungarian rights to use their 
mother tongue in the school system, in courts, and administration were severely reduced, 
and representatives of minorities were removed from leading positions on all levels.  The 
state intensified a process of increasing the number of ethnic Romanians in areas where 
prevailed the Hungarian ethnic element.  The goal of this policy was to assimilate the 
Hungarian minority population through the resettlement in Transylvania of thousands of 
Romanians.97  
In Bulgaria, during the Ottoman rule, there was a large colonization of Muslim 
settlers from Anatolia while many Bulgarians were massacred or escaped to the 
mountains.  In these areas, the Turks developed a class of Turkish landlords who held the 
key positions.  However, this process undertook a reverse direction with the creation of 
the modern Bulgarian state in 1878.98  The unwillingness to familiarize with the newly 
created Christian state obliged a large number of Bulgaria’s Turkish-speaking inhabitants 
to emigrate.  Thus, while in 1881 they represented almost 25% of the population of 
Bulgaria, in 1910 they presented only 11%.99  Moreover, the new Bulgarian state was 
reluctant to allocate sufficient funds for the development of the region inhabited by 
Turks, which was the cause for the increasing backwardness of this region.  This policy 
alienated this ethnic group from the Bulgarian state contributing to the preservation of the 
feeling of belonging to Turkey.  
During the Communist rule, in Bulgaria, as in the case of Romania, Moscow 
influenced the policy toward the Turks.  Thus, the Bulgarian state granted to them 
substantial political and cultural rights, and began to give funding from the state budget 
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to build schools and cultural institutions for Turkish education.  This autonomy was seen 
as a step towards integrating the Turkish minority into a transnational communist society 
based on the Soviet model. However, the Bulgarian communist leaders did not internalize 
this policy and as soon as the process of de-Stalinization gave them larger freedom of 
action, they started to change course.  For the next 25 years, they attempted to integrate 
the Turkish population not in some shapeless communist entity but in a nation, which, 
even as communist, would stil l be perceptibly as Bulgarian.  The integration was planned 
to come about through gradual cultural and economic homogenization.  
Taking into consideration that evolutionary assimilation did not fulfill the 
expectations placed upon it by the party leadership, this policy was replaced by the 
process of the forced assimilation of the Turks.100  By the mid-1980s, the Turkish 
minority was forced to change their names and adopt Bulgarian ones.  Brutal measures 
were introduced against Islam religion and the Turkish language.  Over 1,000 Turks were 
held in prison and over one hundred were killed.101  During the mass demonstrations of 
Turks in 1989, the communist authorities used violence and provoked mass emigration of 
Turks to Turkey.  “The biggest wave of Turkish emig ration occurred in 1989…when 
310,000 Turks left Bulgaria as a result of the Zhivkov regime’s assimilation campaign.102  
After the fall of Zhivkov, his successors tried to restore the rights to the Turkish 
population in Bulgaria.  
In sum, with so many ethnic divisions in the Balkans, it is clear now that the ethno 
nationalism and his ultimate goal of border changing will not and cannot satisfy 
everyone.  In fact, the process of border changes in the Balkans has been going on for 
centuries, and rewarding ethno-territorial nationalism would require enlarging the area of 
the region maybe fivefold.  That being the case, the ethnic divisions still have a great 
potential for expansion and conflict.  
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B. RELIGION DIVISIONS 
Like much of early Europe, Christianity based on the Roman Catholic Church 
predominated throughout the region in the ancient times.  The refusal of Greek patriarchs 
at Constantinople to recognize the claims of primacy of the bishop of Rome led to the 
Great Schism of East and West.  This Schism became definitive in 1054 dividing the 
Christian world into the Roman Catholic and the Greek Orthodox churches. 103 
From the viewpoint of Christian Orthodoxy, the Roman Catholicism, after the 
1054 Schism, considered himself a diversion from Christian Orthodoxy.  Catholicism, on 
the other hand, claims just the opposite.  One way or another, Constantinople and Rome 
turned into two symbols of two mutually exclusive Catholic Christian prospects and of 
two mutually hostile Christian universal communities .  
The geographic dividing line between the two churches fell across the Balkans.  
Thus, Croats and Slovenes remained under the Roman Catholicism and Bulgarians, 
Serbs, and Romanians came under the religion rule of Christian Orthodoxy.  Taking into 
consideration that the two branches of the Christian Church continued to draw apart, it is 
understandable that this process further alienated their respective followers from each 
other.104  
The religion situation in the Balkans became more complicated with the arrival of 
Islam.  In fact, the Turks did not practice the forced conversion to Islam.  However, the 
civil discriminations and economic mistreatments caused a voluntary conversion mainly 
in Bosnia and Albania where 65% of the people were converted to Moslems.105  
Therefore, there are three bigger religious communities of special significance within the 
borders of the Balkans.  Firstly, the Christian Orthodox community, the largest in 
number, includes Bulgaria, Rumania, and Serbia.  Macedonia also belongs to the world 
of Christian Orthodoxy but the percentage of Muslims in this country is significant.  In 
Albania, a traditionally Christian Orthodox population account for 20% of population.  
                                          
103 During the ninth and tenth centuries, the first and second waves of barbarians finished the process 
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There is also a significant Orthodox community within the borders of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  Secondly, the Muslim community includes about 65% of the population in 
Albania and Bosnia.  In Bulgaria, Muslim community accounts for nearly 10% of the 
country’s population.  Thirdly, the Catholic community includes Slovenia and Croatia.  
In Albania a traditionally Catholic population account for 15% of the country’s 
population.  Part of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina is Catholic.  There are also 
Catholic communities in all the Balkan countries.106 
The establishment of the Ottomans in the Balkans split the “Mediterranean world” 
into two clashing camps of Christianity and Islam.  Being cut from its sources in the Near 
East, the West launched a crusade to reestablish this connection.  “The successful 
Ottoman expansion toward Central Europe until the end of the sixteenth century kept the 
idea of crusade alive…until the end of seventeenth century when the recession of the 
Ottoman Empire in Europe became…irreversible. 107  
Even though the Balkans never experienced the kind of religious wars that were 
fought in western and central Europe, the religion however played a significant role in the 
ethnic conflicts.  The propensity to identify religion affiliation with a specific ethnic 
group on the one hand and the relative religion freedom within the Ottoman Emp ire on 
the other hand, combined to make local churches the main symbol of the nationalism 
within the Balkans.  Thus, the Latin Church was not only an important element that made 
the Croats different from Serbs, but also it was a rallying point for Croatian  nationalism 
against the Serbs.  In the same way, the Serbian Orthodox Church became the focus of 
Serbian nationalism until the Second World War.108  
However, during communist dictatorship all the Balkan countries brutally 
suppressed and victimized religion for more than four decades.  This has left its 
impression on contemporary Balkan societies making them free from serious religious 
influences.  That being the case, the Eastern Orthodox and Catholic Churches as well as 
religious Muslim institutions are actually incapable to be the spiritual leaders of their 
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followers.  As far as the leaders of political parties in Albania and Bosnia, they are very 
careful not to be identified with Islam, not to speak of any form of Islamic radicalism.  
C. LANGUAGE DIVISIONS 
The massive migration that passed through the region added a variety of 
languages within it.  Serbo-Croatian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, joined the ancient 
languages of the region.  In addition, there are minorities speaking in Greek, Italian, 
Magyar, and Turkish.109 
Considering that the spoken or written language directly establishes an individual 
ethnic identity and his nation, it is clear that the language is inextricably linked with 
religion and ethnic identity.  Only Albanians, for example speak Albanian an d the same 
for Bulgarians and Romanians.  This concept has gone further getting application even 
within a country.  “Within the former Yugoslavia…dialects divide the official language 
along the ethnic lines….  Croats adamantly speak Croatian, while Serbs…r igidly speaks 
Serbian.”110  
However, even though the language is an important criterion that helps in forging 
a nation, it is clear that keeping alive a strong solidarity requires strong “cement” 
composed of language, religion, and ethnicity.  Thus, for example, the Serbs and the 
Croats discovered at the beginning of the 19th century that they were speaking almost the 
same language: Serbo-Croatian.111  The Yugoslav nation was thus “practically” born.  
Once the Yugoslav state was dismantled, the language followed in the same path: Serbian 
and Croatian are actually proclaimed as distinct languages.112 
The consequences of the proliferation of languages along the ethnic lines have 
exercised strong influences in the region.  “The efforts of scholars and politicians to 
divide these peoples…into Bulgarians, Croats, Serbs, and, later, Macedonians, with 
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language as chief consideration, was to lead to recrimination and hatred in the future.”113  
What happened in the Balkans in the last decade is a confirmation of the above jud gment. 
D. CULTURAL DIVISIONS 
Taking into consideration that culture is defined as “the body of customary 
beliefs, social forms, and material traits constituting a distinct complex of tradition of 
racial [ethnic], religious, or social groups”114, it is understandable the linguistic, religious, 
and ethnic clashes in the Balkans constitute the fundamental elements of the diversity and 
clash of cultures.  Thus, violence is deep-rooted in the culture of the region.  
The cultural differences started with the separation between Rome and 
Byzantium.  The dividing border between Rome and Byzantium became the cultural 
dividing line between Occident and Orient.  Even though a series of conquerors passed 
through the region and left their cultural indications, the key cultu ral gulf resulted from 
the clash of Ottoman and European cultures.115  
Considering that the Balkans contains a mixture of Albanian, Croatian, 
Romanian, Ottoman, and Slav cultures and the fact that each of them has claimed for 
itself as being the major contributor in the region, it is clear that no one culture dominate 
in the Western Balkans.  Moreover, the various cultures are exclusive in nature.  It means 
that an individual cannot win a green card for membership if he does not fulfill all the 
obligatory prerequisites (religion, language, and ethnic origin).  “Because Bosnians have 
been unable to develop either an independent culture or a culture that conforms to one or 
the other cultures in the region, they have been denied entrance into either.”116  This has 
shaped in the region a cultural mentality that can be defined as “us versus them”.  
The main conclusion that comes out of this chapter is that the negative impact of 
ethnic, language, religion, and cultural divisions in the Balkans is an important elements 
that need to take into account in building up a strategy for de -Balkanizing the region.  
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The recommendations how to built reliable mechanisms that can overpass this negative 
impact will be provided in the last chapter. 
41 
IV. RECENT ROOTS OF CONFLICT: COLLAPS E OF 
BIPOLARITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND SOUTH SLAV 
INSOLVENT NATIONALISM 
The challenge of this epoch is to mesh the centripetal forces of economics 
with the centrifugal ones of politics117 
At the beginning of 1991, the declarations of independence of two repu blics—
Slovenia and Croatia— were a warning sign for the start of a bloody conflict over the 
question of how the Yugoslavia’s borders would be redrawn.  The jumble of lands and 
peoples once known as Yugoslavia gave shocking evidence that some of Europe's 
beloved hopes were only illusions.118  The multicultural and multinational experiment 
did not merely fail.  It also exhibited the most inhuman and arbitrary violence amongst 
ethnic groups.  Moreover, coming at the height of euphoria over the end of the cold war, 
the international community was faced with an unwelcome and unexpected set of tasks.  
From the beginning, a powerful thesis for explaining the bloody conflicts in 
Yugoslavia has been its portrayal as a product of centuries -old ethnic hatreds between the 
region’s peoples.  Arguments introduced in the two previous chapters strongly support 
the ancient hatred thesis.  The main weakness that refutes this thesis and the argument 
that violence has been a way of life in the region is the fact that Yugoslavia dur ing the 
Cold War was a multiethnic and multi-national state in which people of different ethnic 
groups lived peacefully.  Hence, besides the influence of the old roots in the conflict, 
which broke up Yugoslavia, the collapse of bipolarity and the economic crises, which 
gripped the country in the 1980s, had a strong impact on its descent into war. 119  With the 
collapse of bipolarity, ex-communists sought legitimacy by appealing to nationalism.  
They saw nationalism as an opportunity to retain political power u nder new rules 
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requiring competitive elections.  Economic crises created a “healthy” terrain for the rising 
of nationalism.120 
This chapter is composed of two main sections:  First, it examines the impact on 
the Balkans of the disintegration of international order.  Second, it explains the 
relationship between economic decline and the rise of insolvent nationalism and their 
combined effect on the conflicts in the Balkans.121 
A. THE IMPACT OF THE COLLAPSE OF BIPOLARITY ON THE 
DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 
During the Cold War era, the  Balkans became a sort of tampon zone in relations 
between the two blocks.122  Even though the techniques that superpowers employed for 
keeping errant states under control differed according to the ideological precepts of East 
and West, they both employed a combination of “carrot and stick” to avoid the anarchy 
within each block.  Maintenance of balance in overall relations in European space 
implied the stability in Balkans, where each of the two great powers provided security for 
their own allies while Yugoslavia was left with a leading role in the non -alignment 
policy.  
Considering that the military repertoires of the two great alliances —the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) —
included responses to the contingency of the breakup of Yugoslavia, it is understandable 
that if one side had intervened in a Cold War Yugoslav crisis, the competitive campaign 
and the balance of power principle would reject the abstention of the other side.  Thus, 
the international politics of the Cold War contributed significantly to holding Yugoslavia 
together.  It seems unlikely that, during the Cold War, the leaders of either Slovenia or 
Croatia would have made a break for independence had they thought that one 
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consequence of their doing so could well have been East–West war.123  Therefore, the 
Cold War, and the division of Europe into two rival alliances, was actually a force for 
stability.  It kept a restraining hand on the boiling hatreds of unassimilated ethnic gr oups 
in the Balkans.  Fear of the Soviet Union’s intervention, and the iron hand of local 
communist authorities, ensured for nearly half century a deceptive tranquility in the 
Balkans.  However, we are now realizing how fragile this tranquility was because it 
depended on control from the top rather than self -restraint from below.124     
Historically the Balkans as a region was never able to create a normal 
geoplolitical configuration that would enable emergence of a center as a focal point to 
which the peripheral states could gravitate to receive some cultural, economic, and 
technological benefits. The traditional differences: cultural, religious, linguistic, ethnic, 
and political have prevented creation of institutions that could be used as a mediator or 
crisis management center. That being the case, the Balkans states, where such kind of 
centers never really existed, gravitated to powers that were out of their own geopolotical 
space ( Russia, Germany, and France).  The collapse of bipolarity left the region 
completely unprepared regarding security concerns, and , therefore, the dissolution of the 
balance between the two blocks resulted in a security vacuum.125  Thus, the end of the 
Cold War clearly showed that the region was unsuplied with mechanisms of crisis 
prevention or resolution, and all the Balkan states were left standing alone in search for 
their new security umbrella.  
As far Yugoslavia, the collapse of the Soviet Union accompanied with the 
collapse of Stalinist regimes in Balkans at the end of the 1980s meant the collapse of the 
maneuver which had formed a central component of the policies pursued over the 
preceding four decades by the Yugoslav’s leader, Josip Broz Tito. Understanding that the 
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Western Powers needed Yugoslavia as an asset in the political conflict with the Soviet 
Union, Tito utilized the foreign economic aid and strategic environment to build up the 
country’s stability.126  Yugoslavia’s geo-strategic importance and all the economic 
benefits that derived from this importance ended with the end of the Cold War.  
However, when the U.S. foreign policy dropped its traditional security priority from 
Yugoslavia and placed this country in the same category as other countries in the region, 
nothing was planned to fill this vacuum.  Neither the European Community (EC) nor 
NATO welcomed the request for membership coming from Balkans’ countries.  In fact, 
the West embarked on a policy of differentiation between Balkans and the other Eastern 
Europe countries regarding the incorporation of these countries. 127  Moreover, wanting to 
move gradually in transforming cold war security alliances, the Western leaders were 
reluctant to act in Yugoslavia.  Unprepared for the required actions, the EC strayed in its 
efforts to find a solution.  This enabled the conflict to turn into a full-scale war in the 
center of the European continent.  Thus, the collapse of Yugoslavia into nationalist 
regimes clearly exposed a crisis of Western Security regimes.  
Two considerations explain why Europe was very concerned about stabiliz ation 
of the situation in the region.  First, this conflict of little significance had emerged as the 
most challenging threat to existing institutions.  Second, Europe  was swept by a huge 
wave of refugees, which transferred parts of the security problems out of the Balkan 
region itself.  It is understandable that this transfer of crises and its impact on Europian 
security led to a more timely European reaction towards stabilization of the situation. 128 
Furthermore, American policy, initially leaving the resolution of the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia to the Europeans, gradually started to take over the initiative and finally 
became the key factor in solving the security problems in the Balkans.  
B. ECONOMIC DECLINE AND INSOLVENT NATIONALISM  
Categorizing the Ba lkan countries based on the points of convergence of the 
economic models of development during the Cold War, divides them in two groups: 
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· First, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania.  During the Cold War, these 
countries were severe dictatorships with a very centralized economy.  It 
means that the intellectual elite had a lack of knowledge of the functioning 
of the market economy.  The state as a representation of the common 
interest was weak while the economic structures were vague. 129 
· Second, former Yugoslavia, a socialist country, which deviated and tried 
to apply a different economic model consisting of so-called market 
socialism founded on workers’ self -management.  This model did not 
worked well because it was based on a coalition between enterprises and 
the authorities who often shared the same interests.130  Thus, this model 
impeded the competitive behavior of the enterprises.  
In the cases of Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania, with the demise of communism 
since the late of 1980s, the economic crisis manifested itself as a drop in the main 
macroeconomic indicators (see Table IV.1).  These have been products of a process of a 
deep social, economic, and political transformation, expressing the phenomenon of 
transition. 
 
Table IV.1. Economic Indicators of the Balkans States. 
  
    State          Growth        Unemployment           Inflation 
        (Percent [Year])         (Percent)              (Percent [date]) 
   Albania          5.8   (1989)       NA           6 (June 1992) 
                               -21.1  (1991) 
   Bosnia-  NA              NA     86 monthly 
   Herzegovina                    (April 1992)  
   Bulgaria          5.8 (1988)                      13.5    100 
                                -25 (1991)           (1992)              (1992) 
   Croatia          3.4                                   20                                40 monthly 
                    30 (1991)                                                 (Dec 1992) 
   Macedonia           -18 (Jan 1992)            20    70 monthly 
                                                                                                             (May 1992)  
    Romania          0.8 (1987)            8.7        250 
                                -8.0 (1991)           (1992)      (1992) 
    Remain               -0.5 (1989)            19 (1991)               235 (1991) 
    Yugoslavia          -15 (1991)         
 
From:  Political Risk Services, IBC USA Publications, East Europe and Republics, July 1992  
RFE/RL Research Report, January 15, 1992, 34. Transition, vol. 3, no. 7 (July 1992): p. 17.  
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In the case of Yugoslavia, the roots of the economic crisis can be found earlier. In 
fact, they are a mixture of external and domestic forces.  Thus, external factors such as 
soaring oil prices starting in 1973, heavy international lending, and the international debt 
crisis exacerbated the in ternal economic problems stemming from Yugoslavia’s 
economic model.  Particularly damaging was the failure of the efforts to find a reliable 
method for controlling inflation.  By 1975, inflation had reached 30 percent.131  The rate 
of inflation rose accordingly, while the balance of trade deteriorated to the extent that it 
could not be covered with workers’ remittances and tourism revenues.  Furthermore, the 
increases in the price of oil and other imported goods, beginning in the early 1970s, 
exacerbated the deficit in the balance of payments.  The 1970s ended with an increasingly 
intractable foreign debt.   At the time of Tito’s death in May 1980, Yugoslavia had a 
foreign debt of $20 billion, the result of generous international loans because of 
Yugoslavia’s strategic nonaligned position relative to the Cold War superpowers.  
Contributions from American banks during the 1970s flooded with petrodollars from the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the rise, in oil prices in the 
wake of 1973, contributed to the Yugoslav debt.132  That being the case, the government 
had no choice but to initiate a stabilization program consisting of tight monetary policy 
and direct controls on investment expenditures.  This program, which started toward the 
end of 1979, was supported by a standby arrangement with the Internal Monetary Fund 
(IMF), concluded in May 1980.  However, in early 1982 IMF negotiations unexpectedly 
took a serious turn for the worse when the IMF team, reflecting a change of policy in 
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Washington, hardened its terms and bargaining position.133  In fact, the lack of monetary 
discipline produced a dispersed authority over money, credit, and foreign exchange.  
Because global integration requires a unified domestic market, the IMF oriented 
Yugoslavia  towards reintegration of the segmented economies of republics.  Based on 
this policy, only price signals and opportunities for profit would define the movement of 
labor, capital, and goods across the republican borders.  This forced the Yugoslav federal 
government to adopt a policy of asserting more control over the republics.  It is understandable 
that the wealthier republics resisted this policy because they had little to gain from the federal 
union.  Strengthening the federal case for increased financia l authority at the center later 
in 1987 was a scandal that weakened the federal government and shook the republics’ 
commitments to the federal regime.134  Thus, the IMF pressure to re -centralize the Yugoslav 
economy fueled tensions between those Yugoslav politicians who favored a strong federal 
government and those who preferred decentralization of power to the republics.  Moreover, the 
shrinking economic pie fueled animosity between Yugoslavia’s different ethnic groups and 
reinforced social divisions.  “In those poorer communities where job cuts were most 
severe…the employment requirements of proportionality and parity among national 
groups made ethnicity more salient rather than less.”135  The ethnic and political tensions 
eroded the Yugoslav middle class, which had provided a base of political moderation,  
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Figure IV.1. Yugoslav Rate of Unemployment, 1979-1988. 
From:  Joze Mencinger, “Privredna Reforma i Nezaposlenost,” in Privedna Kretanja Jugoslavije, vol. 3 
(1990), p. 37. 
and fueled the secessionist aspirations of the more economically successful Yugoslav 
republics in the prewar period. 
On the other hand, beginning in 1975, remittances from workers temporarily 
employed in Western Europe begun to fall as recession set in the west.  Facing rising 
unemployment, Western European countries sent tens of thousands of Yugoslav guest 
workers home.  It is understandable that their return to Yugoslavia exacerbated the 
economic crisis.  For example, in the early 1980, these remittances had financed half of 
the Yugoslav trade deficit.  By 1981, they provided only 25 percent of the deficit.136  
Moreover, the returning guest workers exacerbated unemployment’s problems.  Thus, 
unemployment in Yugoslavia rose from 14 percent in 1979 to 17 percent by 1986 (see 
Figure IV.1), and to more than 20 percent in the republics of Serbia, Montenegro, 
Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Figure IV.2).137 
Accustomed for more than twenty years to abundant imported foreign goods, 
Yugoslavs in the 1980s faced shortages, long lines, and meager supplies on store shelves .  
From 1970 to 1980, inflation had averaged 18.4 per cent per year.  It accelerated through 
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the 1980s, ranging between 85 and 105 per cent annually in the early 1980s, reaching 
800-900 per cent by the end of the 1980s, and averagin g 123 per cent annually from 1979 
to 1989 (see Figure IV.3).138  Growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) fell from 
more than 5 percent in 1979 to less than 15 percent between 1989 and 1991, when war 
broke out between Croatia and Serbia (see Figure IV.4).139 
In multiethnic societies such as Yugoslavia in which sub-state divisions were drawn 
according to linguistic, religion, and ethnic lines, regional economic competition was 
interpreted as interethnic competition.  Therefore, when economic conditions 
deteriorated, competition became nastier and fueled nationalist policy.  In addition, 
perceptions of economic injustice among the different ethnic groups shaped the 
evaluation of the relative costs and benefits of belonging to a national union.  During the 
economic crises, in which costs outweighed benefits, economic factors fueled ethnic, 
religion, and cultural factors to form a set of demands that included leaving the union.140   
Only a nation built on very strong and deep foundations can withstand rapid 
economic erosion.  Yugoslavia was not such a nation.  The single party state proved, in 
the long run, unable to deal successfully with the legacy of inter -republic tensions.  The 
lack of an organized opposition party, which could cross republic lines and unite peop le 
once the ruling party had been discredited, also had influenced the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia.  Moreover, in both Serbia and Croatia, demagogic leaders whose appeal to 
their constituents was based on ethnic loyalties seized power.  
The failure of the federal leadership to face down the accelerating economic crisis 
exposed the power vacuum that the death of Tito had left at the federal level.  This 
opened the way for new leaders in republics to assert themselves. In 1986, a younger 
man, Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, seized this chance.  
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Figure IV.2. Unemployment Rates in Yugoslavia by Republic, 1979 – 90. 
From: For 1979 – 88, Joze Mencinger, “Privredna Reforma i Nezaposlenost,” in Privedna Kretanja 
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Figure IV.3. Annual Inflation Rates in Yugoslavia, 1979-91. 
From:  International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook : 1992 (Washington: 
1992), pp. 748 -49; and IMF, International Financial Statistics (Washington: November 1992), p. 566.  
 
During 1988-89, Serbia's intelligentsia and Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian 
Communist party elite joined forces to encourage a national revolution to create a 
“unified Serbia” by tapping social and national discontent in the republic.  The nationalist 
message hammered over and over again by Milosevic was the idea that if the 
Yugoslavian state disintegrated, whole sections of the Serbian people —in Croatia, in 
Bosnia, and in Kosovo—would be left to suffer under the control of other nations.  
Milosevic based his claims for a greater Serbia on the need to unite all Serbs in 
Yugoslavia into a single state.   
The nationalist ideology of being threatened and reviled fueled Serbian mass 
movements.  Slobodan Milosevic also mobilized Croatian Serbs by helping to organize 
meetings where they declared their demands for cultural and political autonomy.  
Insecurity was expressed in the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts of 1986, which became the manifesto of the latest Serbian nationalist revival filled 
with the rhetoric of victimization.  Based on these lessons, Slobodan Milosevic at Kosovo 
Polje in April 1987 gave the Kosovar Serbs his famous promise: “No one should dare 
beat you.”141 
                                          
141 John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country , p. 340. 
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Figure IV.4. Growth of GDP in Yugoslavia, 1979-91. 
From: World Bank, World Tables 1991 (Washington, 1991), pp. 624 -25; and World Tables 1992 
(Washington, 1992), p. 653.  The 1991 figure is an estimate from United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 1991 -1992 (Geneva, 1992), Table 3.2.2, p. 60. 
In 1988 and 89, Milosevic abolished the autonomy of the Kosovo and Vojvodina 
given in the 1974 constitution.  Subsequently, he extended his promise of protection to 
the Serbian Diaspora in other republics of former Yugoslavia. 142  Setting the Serbian 
nationalist rhetoric in full swing, during the 1990s, Milosevic was able to mobilize Serbs 
in the long and bloody series of wars leading progressively to the fragmentation of former 
Yugoslavia. 
It looks strange that in Yugoslavia the ideology of communism—a doctrine that 
professed internationalist principles —slipped so easily into the dogma of nationalism.  
However, orthodox communism and aggressive nationalism have some similarities.  Both 
ideologies are collectivist, emphasizing the group over the individual.  Both are 
exclusivist, identifying outsiders as enemies.  Moreover, both are radical, insisting that 
those enemies be eliminated, preferably by force. Thus, being discredited by the decline 
                                          
142 However, nationalism in Serbia provoked the rise of nationalism in the other republics.  For 
example, in Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, a former partisan and retired general turned extreme nationalist and 
established in February 1989 the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).  Running a campaign for Croatian 
independence, his party won elections in April 1990.  However, Tudjman’s rhetoric antagonized further the 
Serbian minority.  He talked of a “greater Croatia” and decla red his happiness that his wife was “neither a 
Jew nor a Serb.”  Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers , Random 
House: Times Books, 1996, pp. 73-74. 
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of the economy, and scrambling to find a new source of legitimacy, the communists 
embraced dangerous form of nationalism.143   
In his book Nationalism Reframed, Rogers Brubaker identifies three distinct types 
of Central and East European nationalisms of the 1990s : the nationalizing nationalisms of 
newly independent states, the trans -border nationalisms of external national homelands 
and the minority nationalisms within the borders of the new national states. 144  Serbian 
nationalism markedly included Brubaker’s triadic nexus because at the core of the 
Serbian Nationalism stood the desire to own a state, which would be a Serbian nation, 
defined in ethno cultural terms.145  Furthermore, it was a clear manifestation of the 
intentions of Serbia as the “external national homeland” to Serbian minorities in Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, to absorb territories beyond its borders.  The 
nationalism of the Serbs in Croatia, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina corresponded 
to Brubaker’s third category.   
The Balkan economic crisis of the early 1990s shows itself in a wide variety of 
economic problems, including droops in economic growth, inflation, unemployment, and 
the proliferation of underground economies.  Even though the countries in the region had 
experienced many crises in the previous decades, the crisis of the early 1990 was 
different.  It was, in fact, graver and bigger.  GDP dropped sharply during 1992 (Albania, 
-21.1 percent; Bulgaria, -25.5 percent; Croatia, -30 percent), while inflation soared 
(Bulgaria, 100 percent; Albania 120 percent; Romania 250 percent; Macedonia, 70 
percent monthly; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 86 percent monthly), and unemployment 
climbed (Romania, 9 percent; the new Yugoslavia, 19 percent; Albania, 40 percent). 146  
                                          
143 Ibid, p. 40. 
144 Nationalizing nationalism involves claims made in the name of a core nation and defined in ethno-
cultural terms.  Homeland nationalism asserts the rights and protects the interests of its ethno -national kin 
in the other state.  Thus, homeland nationalism is in direct opposition to and in dynamic interaction with 
nationalizing nationalism.  Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National 
Question in the New Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 4-5. 
145 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the 1986 was an explicit e xpression 
of the Serbia’s intentions for having a nation defined in ethno cultural terms.  Carl -Ulrick Schierup, 
Scramble for the Balkans: Nationalism, Globalism and the Political Economy of Reconstruction , 
Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp. 53-55.  
146 For example, Albania and Romania economies had gone down since the 1980s while Yugoslavia 
was in a perpetual crisis since that time.  Maria Zarkovic Bookman, Economic Decline and Nationalism in 
the Balkans, p.21. 
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In the 1990s, two major forces tore up the Balkans countries.  These are economic 
decline and insolvent nationalism.  Yugoslavia may be viewed as the epicenter of an 
earthquake that shook the entire region, and thus, elements of economic decline and 
insolvent nationalism were visib le at this early stage across the region.  While in the 
former Yugoslavia there was a interaction and convergence of economic decline and 
nationalism, which resulted in a bloody conflict, the other Balkans countries suffered 
only economic decline and they are still struggling with the transition from a centralized 
economy towards a market one. 147  For example, Romania and Bulgaria both faced 
economic difficulties associated with the collapse of communism.  In these states, 
nationalist governments appealed to the ethnicity of the majority, while the multiparty 
system produced nationalistic political parties, which protected the right of ethnic 
minorities.  In Romania, the Democratic National Salvation Front was renamed in July 
1993 the Party of Social Democrats.  In Bulgaria, the leader of the ruling party at the 
early stage, Zhelyu Zhelev was so strong that he was accused of politically re-
communizing the country.  However, at this time, they did not openly foster territorial 
claims.148  
To sum up this chapter, the recent roots of conflicts in Yugoslavia can be found in 
the country’s failure to adapt to the new circumstances.  This contributed to rising 
hostilities between ethnic groups fighting for a share of an ever -shrinking economic pie.  
In addition, Yugoslavia’s exposure to the international economic crisis in the 
1980s and the reforms advised by international institutions, particularly re-centralization 
of the Yugoslav economy accelerated the forces leading to country’s disintegration.  
                                          
147 Taking into consideration the deep ethnic, lingui stic, cultural, and religious divisions in the former 
Yugoslavia that we have discussed in the previous chapters, it is understandable why economic decline 
fueled insolvent nationalism.  
148 Milica Zarkovic Bookman, Economic Decline and Nationalism in Balkan s, pp. 20-27.  
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V. CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION AND CHALLENGES 
FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE 
Three years after the end of NATO's intervention in Kosovo, South East Europe 
(SEE) remains a volatile, insecure and economically depressed region.  Support for 
democratic institutions is low, corruption is endemic, and public expectations are 
pessimistic.  There are clearly differences in the situations of the individual countries but 
as a whole, the region is still viewed as an unstable and insecure place for business and 
investment.   
The Kosovo crisis and its aftermath was, in some ways, a defining event for the 
region.  First, the crisis threatened all SEE countries, although to different degrees, 
underlining their interdependence.  Second, the international community decided to 
follow a regional approach in assisting these countries in coping with the crisis and 
building the peace that followed.  This approach concluded with the creation of the 
Stability Pact for South East Europe (the Cologne document of June 10, 1999).  Almost 
at the same time, in May 1999, the European Union (EU) established the Stabilization 
and Association process to provide a clear path for the integration with the EU of those 
South East European countries that did not have Europe Agreements.149  However, the 
post conflict reconstruction has not spurred growth, unemployment has risen, and 
security tensions in Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo still persist.  The Stability Pact has 
not delivered practical results and the lack of a result oriented economic strategy is 
evident.  Therefore, the peoples of South Eastern Europe and the international community 
must take a comprehensive and forward -looking approach to the current situation if those 
expectations are not to remain unfulfilled. In this context, among the other issues, the 
economic revival is a crucial one.  Unless this issue is addressed quickly and decisively, 
the potential for renewed conflict remains serious.   
The focus of the chapter is: 
                                          
149 Building Peace in South Eastern Europe: Macroeconomic Policies and Structural Reforms Since 
the Kosovo Conflict, A joint International Monetary Fund-World Bank Paper, 2001, Information Available 
Internet, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/kosovo/102501.pdf . 
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· To survey the current economic situations in South Eastern Europe 
Countries 
· To analyze and demonstrate lessons learned from the deep political and 
economic crises in Albania.  
· To look at the key challenges that the region its actually facing.  
A. THE RECENT ECONOMIC SITUATION IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE 
COUNTRIES  
What is the reality of South Eastern Europe?  The total population is 56 million, 
about 84 percent of the population of the five Central European countries (CEE) and 15 
percent of the European Union’s population of 375 million.150  The total GDP is about 
USD 90 billion and is slightly more than one-third of the five CEE countries. The GDP 
per capita is less than USD 2000.  Per capita incomes in the SEE countries span a wide 
range from US$4,520 per capita in Croatia —which is almost equivalent to the CEE 
average—to US$810 per capita in Albania. 151  However, in almost all SEE countries, 
official GNP figures are likely to be underestimated due to the large informal sectors in 
these economies.  
The Political and Economic developments in the post-communist countries in the 
SEE have been disappointing.  The main reasons are: 
· Security concerns.  
· Slow or indecisive transition 
1. Security Problems 
There is a large area of contested territory in the region.   The area consists of the 
whole Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts of Montenegro, Serbia and FYR 
Macedonia.  These entities are not really states because they have no clear borders, which 
is the main characteristic of a state.  Therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a long way 
from being a state, Kosovo is not a political unit at all, and Montenegro is mid -way 
between a state and a federal unit.  That being the case, it is understandable that the 
overall security of the other countries in the region (Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania), 
                                          
150 Central European countries are: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Slovak Republic.  
151 The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern Europe: A Regiona l Strategy Paper, The 
World Bank, March 2000, p. 10, Information Available on the Internet, 
www.seerecon.org/RegionalInitiatives/WBRegionalStrategy/contents.htm . 
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though not directly threatened, has been affected via the increase in negative security 
spillovers and in the delay in the integration of the region into the Euro-Atlantic security 
structures.  All of these have impacted the internal security of the all SEE countries, 
making difficult for them to move decisively towards the establi shment of the rule of 
law.152 
2. Slow or Indecisive Transition  
South Eastern Europe has been the least developed region of Europe.  Therefore, 
the initial conditions at the onset of the transition process were less favorable than those 
in others transition countries in Europe.  Furthermore, while countries of CEE decided, in 
the beginning, to give the transition a chance, the countries of SEE chose to give priority 
other issues.  For instance, Serbia decided to fight and it is understandable that in the 
areas where wars were fought, the transition had no possibility of working.  In Albania, 
internal tensions and legal deficiencies led to an institutional meltdown while in the cases 
of Croatia and Macedonia, nation-building took precedence over transition.153  In 
Bulgaria and Romania, transition was delayed and implemented without a sustainable 
commitment.  The reasons are not the same in both countries.  In the case of Romania, 
the public was not ready to give up on certain aspects of socialist economic policies 
(mainly price controls and subsidies to ailing enterprises).  Thus, Romania started the 
implementation of the reform’s elements when the economic situation had already 
worsened considerably.  In the case of Bulgaria, the reasons for a slow transition are 
related to unfavorable institutional development or rather to the lack of such 
development.  The essence of transition is a fundamental institutional change from non -
market and non-democratic institutions to markets and democracy.  From this viewpoint, 
it is clear that a slow transition means the collapse of the existing institutions without a 
simultaneous introduction of substitutes.154 
 
                                          
152 Task Force on Economic Strategy for South Eastern Europe,  EAST WEST INSTITUTE, June 
2000, p. 9, Information Available on the Internet, www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/reports00.html.  
153 Ibid, p. 10. 
154 For more information about the inferior macroeconomic and microeconomic performances in some 
countries in transition by the process of institutional disorganization see, Blanchard, O., M. Kremer 
Disorganization, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112: pp. 1091-1126. 
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3. Economic Performance in South Eastern Europe  
Having a better understanding of the economic situations of the SEE countries 
requires making some remarks on the relevance of the main economic indicators, which 
have considerable influence on the description of the situation in the SEE.  
a. Inflation and GDP  
Keeping inflation under control is a major goal of economic policy 
because it creates a useful terrain for achieving sustainable economic growth.  However, 
when low inflation coexists with very high unemployment this is a clear sign that 
something is wrong.  Even though the informal sector is a means for mitigating the pains 
of unemployment, it cannot be justified because it introduces other issues through the 
back door—namely, the transparency of the economy and rules of behavior.  Taking into 
consideration that in South Eastern Europe the informal sector is fueled by the lac k of a 
legal framework and by weak institutions, it is understandable that for these countries the 
shadow economy presents a big threat for their societies.155 
Economic growth is a key element during the transition.  Successful 
economic growth creates possib ilities not only for responding to the normal demands of 
citizens but also for judging economic performance during the transition.  However, it is 
very important to keep in mind that there exists a clear distinction between growth and 
recovery.  Only investment in capital goods and technological transfer are indicators that 
growth is occurring along with recovery.  Modern development theories treat eliminating 
restriction on foreign trade and foreign investment as the basis for encouraging growth in 
economies in transition.156   
The decade of transition in South Eastern Europe has produced more or 
less negative economic results.  Production has declined, de-industrialization has been 
significant, and stability has been unsustainable.  The main reasons for the poor economic 
performance of the SEE countries stem mainly from following sources: 
                                          
155 Informal sectors also exist in such rich countries as Italy, Greece, and Spain.  However, existing 
legal framework and consolidated institutions in these countries are important barriers for shrinking 
informal parallel sectors and forging formal sectors.  Daniel Daianu, South Eastern Europe Revised?  Can 
Economic Declined be Stopped? The Institute for Security Studies: Western European Union, October 
20000, p. 12, Information Available on the Internet. www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ21.pdf .  
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· the relative economic backwardness of most of the region, rooted in its 
history157 
· the SEE countries started the transition from a position where institutions 
were weak, polit ical uncertainty was high, and civil societies were 
fragmented 
· while the CEE countries face the problem of transition, the problem that 
the SEE countries face is a combination, not the same for each country, of 
development and transition158 
· the dissolution of the former Yugoslav Republic and its spillover disrupted 
economic activity in all SEE countries159 
· rapid destruction of manufacturing capabilities without substituting 
growth in services  
· the proliferation of organized crime and corruption 
4. Current Economic Situation 
a. GDP 
Domestic policies and the support of the international community 
prevented deterioration of the macroeconomic situation as a result of the Kosovo crisis. 
Despite significant differences among the countries, the region as a whole emerged  from 
the crisis well placed to benefit from the new environment of peace and stability.  The 
civil crisis in Macedonia significantly retarded the economic development, but its impact 
did not spill over to the other countries.  With the exception of Macedo nia, economic 
growth in South Eastern Europe rebounded in 2000 and 2001, averaging some four 
                                          
156 Rodrik, D., Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe’s Transition , in: O. Blanchard, K. A. Froot and J. D. 
Sachs, The Transition in Eastern Europe  – Vol. 2: Restructuring, NBER, 1994, pp. 319 -52. 
157 For example, in 1937, income per capita was at $440 in Great Britain.  The corresponding 
estimates for Bulgaria was $75.  A. Gelb and C. Gray, The Transformation of Economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe, The World Bank 1991, p. 65.  See also D. Chirot, (ed.), The Origins of Backwardness in 
Eastern Europe, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.  
158 The main indicators of the under-development in SEE are: low GDP per capita (less than USD 
2,000), low level of industrialization (the contribution of industry to co untries’ GDP ranges from 10 to 
30%), ?significant levels of agricultural production (10 to 60%), low-skilled services, and export structures 
that consist mainly of raw-materials, agricultural products, and labor-intensive products.  Task Force on 
Economic Strategy for South Eastern Europe, p. 4.  
159 Furthermore, the break-up of Yugoslavia greatly affected the economies of Albania, Bulgaria, and 
Romania because the international community imposed sanction against Milosevich.  The sanctions cut off 
important markets and transit routes for these countries.  The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South 
Eastern Europe, p. 37. 
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percent year-on-year in the region as a whole in the first half of 2001 (main economic 
indicators for South Eastern Europe are shown in appendix 1).160   
b. Unemployment 
Registered unemployment in several SEE countries is easily the highest in 
the entire EC region.  Registered unemployment in FR Yugoslavia, Macedonia, and 
Croatia was, in 2001, respectively 35, 32, and 22 percent.  However, “unemployment 
data in transition economies need to be treated with caution, as many registered 
unemployed work in the informal economy.  This is offset partly by the non -registration 
of the genuinely unemployed, and the removal of people from the unemployment roles 
upon exhaustion of benefits.”161  
c. Inflation 
Inflation in all SEE countries continued in 2000-01 to be dominated by 
adjustments in administrative prices as well as imported energy.  For example, in FR 
Yugoslavia, price liberalization was the main factor that inflation reached 113 percent in 
December 2000.  While in Croatia, excise tax increases and electricity prices accounted 
for over a third of the country’s 7.4 percent inflation during 2000. 162 
d. Banking Systems 
Lack of competition and State interference are major problems of the 
banking systems in the SEE region.  Excluding Macedonia, all SEE countries’ banking 
systems have a large proportion of assets controlled by state -owned banks which are 
generally under ongoing restructuring and privatization programs.  Banking secto r 
liberalization in all the SEE countries has led to a rapid proliferation of small and poorly 
supervised private banks, whose failure could pose systemic risks. 163 
 
                                          
160 Real GDP in Macedonia declined during the same period because of the insurgency crisis.  
Building Peace in South Eastern Europe: Macroeconomic Policies and Structural Reforms Since the 
Kosovo Conflict, p. 9. 
161 The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern Europe: A Regional Strategy Paper, p. 31. 
162 Building Peace in South Eastern Europe: Macroeconomic Policies and Structural Reforms Since 
the Kosovo Conflict, p. 10. 
163 Enforcement of bankruptcy law is a major area of concern across the region.  There are real 
problems with the efficiency and effectiveness of liquidation proceedings.  The Road to Stability and 
Prosperity in South Eastern Europe: A Regional Strategy Paper, pp. 40-41. 
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e. Private Sector 
Estimating the size of the private sector in transition economies is a 
difficult task because many firms operate in the informal economy in order to evade 
taxes, registration requirements and other costs of doing legitimate business.  “In some 
countries of SEE, the informal economy may account for nearly one -half of economic 
activity.”164  The percentage of the private sector in GDP is given in the Figure V.1.  
However, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia, the states retain a dominant 
share in economic activities.  The rise in private sector activity has come largely from t he 
increased rate of privatization over the past two years.  Besides Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and FR Yugoslavia, the other countries have accomplished the small -scale privatization.  
Based Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on the EBRD indicator. 165 Since then, 
however, there has been a significant acceleration and preliminary estimates suggest that 
the SEE region has now overtaken the CIS on the EBRD indicator.  
 




Figure V.1. Private Sector Share in GDP, 1998-2001. 
From:  EBRD Database 
 
                                          
164 Private Sector Development and the Role of EBRD in South -Eastern Europe, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, October 2001, p. 4, Information Available on the Internet, 
www.seerecon.org/Calendar/2001/Events/src/ebrd_psd_in_see.pdf .  
165 Ibid. p. 5. 
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f. Trade 
The effects of the region’s instability over the last decade are clearly seen 
in its performance on trade and investment.  Actually, trade and investment policies are 
not liberal.  While exports from central Europe have more than doubled over the past ten 
years, the exports from the SEE countries have actually shrunk by one third.  In FR 
Yugoslavia exports fell from over $4 billion in 1990 to less than $2 billion in 2000 and in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina they fell over the same period from just under $2 billion to $675 
million in 2000.166  Trade and investment face formal barriers among Kosovo, 
Montenegro, and Serbia because of the disintegration of the common monetary, payment, 
and tariff systems (data for external trade are shown in appendix 2).   
 
   Large scale privatization 
    Average EBRD transition indicator score  
 
Figure V.2. Progress in Large Scale Privatization, 1994-2001. 
From:  EBRD Database 
 
g. Aid Dependence 
Several economies in the region survive only due to massive assistance 
from the international community.  For example, the economy of Bosnia and 
                                          
166 CARDS Assistance Program to the Western Balkans: Regional Strategy Paper (2002 -2006), 
European Commission, p. 12. Information Available on the Internet, 
www.seerecon.org/Calendar/2001/Events/src/ec_cards.pdf .  
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Herzegovina is kept from collapsing with huge inflows of aid and credits. 167 Albania and 
Macedonia also depend significantly on foreign assistance.  However, when the 
dependence on foreign finance becomes chronic, this has negative long-term economic 
consequences.168  
The region can be easily classified as being made up of distressed 
economies based upon these considerations: 
· the high level of unemployment in the region 
· problems in the banking sector s 
· economic dependency on international aid  
· formal and informal trade barriers 
· high level of corruption and organized crime 
B. LESSON LEARNED FROM THE ALBANIA CRISIS 
After 45 years of isolationism, Albania’s economy is making the difficult 
transition to a market economy.  In the beginning, after the collapse of the centrally 
planned system (1990), all the Albanian macroeconomic indicators sharply deteriorated.  
Output fell by nearly half between 1989 and 1992, and inflation hit triple digits.  
However, from 1993 to 1996, the country was regarded as a model in the Balkans for 
progress in macroeconomic stabilization and ongoing reform.  During 1993-95, GDP 
growth averaged close to 10% while inflation fell to a single digit (see Table V.1).    
The collapse of financial pyramid schemes in early 1997, which had attracted 
deposits from 80% of the Albanian population, triggered social unrest, impoverished 
thousands of people, led to a severe economic regression, and undermined the confidence 
of the population in financial services.  What lessons can be drawn from ‘successful’ 
economic growth and the spectacular collapse of Albanian macroeconomic indicators?  
In this matter, I will try to demonstrate the origins of the political and economic collapse 
in 1997.  I consider this very important because the political, economic, and social 
consequences of this crisis were not only unprecedented but also profound.  
 
                                          
167 Task Force on Economic Strategy for South Eastern Europe, p. 33. 
168 This would be a very bad type of Dutch Disease, which refers to the consequences coming from a 
“bad” dependency on foreign aid.  
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Table V.1. Basic Economic Indicators of Albania, 1991–98. 
 
                                                             1991    1992     1993     1994    1995    1996     1997     1998 
                                                                                              (Percent change) 
Real GDP                                           –28.0    –7.2        9.6        9.4       8.9       9.1       –7.0       8.0 
Retail prices (during period)               104.1    236.6     30.9     15.8       6.0      17.4       42.1      8.7  
                                                                                              (In percent of GDP) 
Saving-investment balance  
Foreign saving                                      19.7      57.1     28.7      14.3       9.7      11.5      14.3      8.3 
Domestic saving                                –13.5    –51.9    –15.5       3.6       8.3        4.0        1.7      7.7 
Public                                                 –27.4    –21.9    –14.1   –10.6     –6.5      –9.0     –10.8   –8.1 
Private                                                  13.9    –30.0    –1.5       14.2     14.9      13.0       12.4   15.9 
Investment                                             6.1       5.2      13.2       17.9     18.0     15.5       16.0    16.0  
Public                                                    6.1       4.0         9.5        8.6       8.5       4.5          4.0     5.2 
Private                                                   0.0       1.2        3.7         9.3       9.5      11.0       12.0   10.8  
Fiscal sector 
Revenues                                             31.7      23.5      25.7       24.5     23.9     18.3       16.9    20.3 
Expenditures                                        62.2      44.0      40.2      36.3     34.3      30.3      29.4    30.7  
Overall deficit                                      43.9      20.3      14.4      12.4     10.3      11.7      12.6    10.4 
Domestically financed deficit              43.9      20.0        9.1        7.0       6.6      10.6      10.8     6.4  
Monetary indicators  
Broad money growth (in percent)          …         …       75.0       40.6     51.8     43.8      28.4    19.9 
Growth in private sector (in percent)      …         …        …         61.4     15.9     30.5     19.0    15.8  
Velocity of circulation                            …         …       3.68       2.83     2.22     1.97     1.92    1.94 
Interest rate (3 months deposits)            …          …      14.0         7.0      10.0     18.5     26.0    16.5  
From:  Albanian authorities and Fund staff estimates  
 
1. Economic and Political Background to the Emergence of Py ramid 
Schemes 
Albania inherited from its communist system an industrial sector that was under -
funded and inefficient.  The collapse of the planned economy substantially reduced the 
industrial infrastructure.  From 1993 to 1996, the World Bank, IMF and fina ncial aid 
were instrumental in achieving a very ‘impressive’ macroeconomic recovery.  However, 
apart from the successful privatization of the agriculture, the achievement has been 
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superficial.169  By early 1997, it was clear that many problems had not been solved.  The 
financial sector remained underdeveloped and the apparent economic success largely was 
realized from remittances of Albanian workers abroad and large -scale smuggling.  
Indeed, with an under-developed banking sector unable to satisfy a growing private 
sector demand for credit, an informal credit market financed by remittances grew and 
turned into pyramid schemes.  The approach of parliamentary election in May 1996 led 
the government to indulge in pre-election wage increases and to put off introduction of a 
Value Added Tax (VAT).  Therefore, the budget deficit and inflation began to rise again.  
The ruling Democratic Party won elections but international community interpreted them 
as being manipulated.  From this point on, the government’s political authority was 
fragile, and its will to make difficult decisions limited.  This was to have significant 
implications for the unfolding pyramid scheme crisis.  
2. Problems in the Financial Sector 
One of the most important causes of the growth of the Pyramid  scheme 
phenomena was the inadequacy of the formal financial system.  The state banks (holding 
over 90% of deposits) were not reliable intermediaries of saving, and private banks were 
not particularly interested in attracting domestic currency deposits.  They had focused 
their attention mostly on trade financing.  The problem in the state bank was not low 
interest rates but inadequacy of the payment system.170  Thus, the public tended to hold 
an unusually high proportion of their financial assets in cash and was on the outlook for 
alternative investment opportunities.  
3. Informal Credit Markets and Pyramid Schemes 
The authorities generally tolerated an informal credit market.  The informal 
market consisted partly of foreign exchange dealers (mostly not licens ed) and partly of a 
number of companies taking deposits and making loans.  These companies were illegal, 
since they were never licensed to take deposits.  They grew out of a credit system based 
not only on private loans from migrant workers to friends and family, but also on loans 
                                          
169 A series of reforms since 1991 has transformed Albanian agriculture.  Under private ownership, 
agriculture experienced a rapid growth and become a key motor for economic recovery.  
170 From mid-1993 onward, the interest rates were consistently above the prevailing rate of inflation.  
In September 1996, the average completion time for payment transactions between accounts at different 
branches of the same state–owned bank was 5-6 days.  Jarvis, Chris.  The Rise and Fall of the Pyramid 
Schemes in Albania. p. 3, Information Available on the Internet: www.netec.mec.ac.uk/. 
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from smuggling activities.  For the authorities, IMF and the World Bank, it was difficult 
to see the vital difference between the informal credit market and the pyramid 
schemes.171  It was so, because they both operated on the premise that there were 
profitable opportunities for investment in small business in Albania.  Both the informal 
credit market and the companies that invested on their own behalf drew resources from 
domestic saving and from flows of remittances estimated at about US$375 million a year 
(about 15% of GDP).  The IMF and the World Bank initially treated the companies that 
invested on their own account as part of the informal credit market.  Thus, an IMF 
mission to advise on financial sector problems at the end of 1995 focused mostly on the 
possibilities for improving the formal financial system by integrating the most positive 
elements of the informal market.  While outside observers raised concerns about the 
possibility of criminals operating in the market, they did  not pick up the true nature of the 
large companies operating at this time, and the scope of their activities, until mid -
1996.172  In the second half of 1996, mania took hold.  Most of the companies raised their 
interest rates from 10% to 30% a month.173  People sold their houses and apartments to  
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171 Pyramid schemes  work on the principles that money paid in by later investors is used to pay 
artificially high returns to earlier investors.  When the interest and principal of the old investor exceed the 
money that the scheme is able to attract from new investors, the scheme collapse s.  
172 Jarvis, Chris, The Rise and Fall of the Pyramid Schemes in Albania .p. 6. 
173 Interest rates in the formal financial sector also rose during this period (see Figure V. 3 and V. 4).  
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invest in the schemes; farmers sold their livestock.  The mood is vividly captured by a 
resident who said that Tirana (capital of Albania), in the autumn of 1996, smelled like a 
slaughterhouse, as farmers drove their animals to market to put the proceeds in the 
pyramid schemes. 
Through all of this, the government was a passive observer.  When the Secret 
Service suggested that some of the companies might be surviving by laundering money 
for the Italian Mafia, the President himself came to their defense, arguing that these were 
legitimate and successful companies. 
The IMF and World Bank did give increasingly strong warnings about the 
schemes in the course of 1996, but these warnings were not heeded and may have been 
too late to do much good in any case.174                  
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174 Only in August 1996 was a strong warning given.  
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4. Collapse 
In October 1996, in Washington, the IMF and World Bank repeated their 
warnings, finally producing a public warning from the Minister of Finance.  Press and 
public reaction was mostly negative.  The IMF was accused of trying to close down 
Albania’s most successful firms.  Finally, in November, one of the companies defaulted 
on its payments and the collapse began. 
It took four months for the remaining pyramid schemes to collapse, bringing 
down with them the Democratic Party government and plunging Albania into anarchy.175 
The government initially tried to limit the damage caused by the pyramid schemes 
and belatedly took some important measures.  Most important, throughout the violence, 
the government stuck firmly to the principle that depositors would not be compensated 
for their losses from the budget.176  This crucial and courageous decision, which was 
endorsed by the opposition, made economic stabilization after the crisis much easier.  
C. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The pyramid schemes were not a product of circumstances unique to Albania.  
The isolation of Albania until recently and the population’s unfamiliarity with market 
institutions may explain the mania that gripped population in 1996.  Pyramid schemes 
have been especially prevalent in transition economies in recent years (Caritas in 
Romania and smaller schemes in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic have come to light) 
but they also exist in industrial countries.177  They rarely come to public attention in 
industrial countries because: 
· There are more people in these countries prepared to point out the 
difference between a credible and an incredible rate of return  
· A better law enforcement prevents them from reaching a newsworthy size  
                                          
175 In January 1997, two companies declared bankruptcy triggering riots. As the riots intensified and 
spread, the remaining schemes ceased payments.  
176 The measures taken later by the government proved to be too little, too late.  The government’s authority, 
shaky since the May 1996 elections, had evaporated, and on March 8, 1997, it resigned.  By this time, Albania was in 
chaos.  The army and police had mostly deserted.  By mid -March, armories were being looted in the south by rioters 
and in the north by the President’s supporters.  Evacuation of foreign nationals and mass emigration of Albanians to 
Italy began.  When Tirana itself fell into civil disorder the president agreed to hold new parliamentary elections by the 
end of June, and an all-party interim coalition government led by members of the former opposition Socialist Party was 
appointed 
177 Jarvis, Chris, The Rise and Fall of the Pyramid Schemes in Albania. p. 26.  
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As we have already seen, some of the conditions that create possibilities for rising 
pyramid schemes in transition economies are: 
· An inadequate banking system 
· An unclear legal system 
· Poor governance 
Moreover, the Albanian e population, poor and conscious of the wealth of 
neighboring countries like Italy, was more than usually susceptible to the promises of the 
pyramid scheme operators.  The Albanian experience is a salutary reminder, for transition 
economies, of what can happen when you slip to undertake bank reform, to enact good 
legislation, and to improve governance.  
D. CHALLENGES FACING THE SEE 
Of the many challenges facing the SEE, the following ones are the most 
significant: 
· Determining the future status of Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia  
· Building up reliable mechanisms that do not allow the transformation of 
political, social, economic, and interstate problems into ethnic conflicts  
· Realizing a greater commitment to transition 
· Enforcing the rule of law  
· Macroeconomic stabilization 
· Completing structural reforms  
· Fiscal consolidation 
· Eliminating all kinds of barriers to trade and development which exist in 
the region and between the region and the outside world   
· Completing the process of liberalization, privatization, and tax reform  
· Restructuring the human capital  
· Improving infrastructure and the envir onment178  
· Integration into Europe 
To sum up, this chapter explained the current economic problems in the SEE and 
the main security concerns that have been the main obstacles to economic development 
                                          
178 Due to collapsing budgets, the countries in the region cannot finance the environmental problems.  
Lack of a modern infrastructure creates problems in profiting from globalization and investments.  
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and successful transition to a market economy in the region.  We dealt with the Albanian 
political and economic crisis of 1997 that resulted from the collapse of financial pyramid 
schemes in early 1997 that triggered social unrest, destroyed the armed forces, 
impoverished thousands of people, led to a severe econo mic regression, and undermined 
the confidence of the population in financial services.  Current economic situation and the 
challenges that the region is facing provide a useful truck for developing the necessary 
recommendations. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
The recommendations of the author take into account the main problems that the 
region faces which were fully developed in the previous chapter.  They are addressed 
mainly to the local actors and to the international community interested in creating 
stability in the region. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Future Status of Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia 
Considering that Kosovo’s Albanians reject in an overwhelming majority any 
form of continued state union with Serbia, it is understandable that the idea that Kosovo, 
Montenegro, and Serbia could in the future form a loose three republic federation is 
wholly unrealistic.  
Referring to Kosovo’s future status, the alternative of conditional independence 
proposed by the Kosovo commission is the best for three reasons: First, conditional 
independence permits the international community to insist that the proper standards be 
met for a period of time before all the benefits of political and economic international 
recognition are granted.  Second, granting a status of conditional independence permits 
the international community to require from Kosovo a binding commitment that it will 
not seek to expand its regional borders.  This will nullify a kind of overstated fear mostly 
expressed by the Macedonian and Serbian leadership s that independence for Kosovo 
would increase the threat of a “greater Albania”.  Third, conditional independence will 
allow Kosovo’s government to demonstrate their willingness and ability to build up 
democratic institutions without being subject to either a loose federation or Serbian 
sovereign authority.179 
As for Montenegro, on 14 March 2002 the leaders of Serbia, Montenegro and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) signed an agreement in Belgrade to replace FRY 
                                          
179 The Kosovo Report, The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000, pp. 271 -9.  
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with a new state community, a union of states to be called “Serbia and Montenegro”. 180  
This agreement was the direct outcome of the European Union's determination to block 
Montenegro separatism and keep the two republics together.  The object of the agreement 
is to establish a loose association in which the two member -states will enjoy virtually all 
the prerogatives of independence except those that depend on international recognition 
(e.g., UN membership).  The republics will become fully responsible for their economies 
and internal security while the union will depend on the republics to fund its institutions: 
an assembly, a president, a council of ministers, a court, and the armed forces.  However, 
thus far the immediate challenge of agreeing on the detailed content of their new union 
has seemed unrealizable.  Being in that gloomy situation, the EU, in line with the 14 
March agreement, should be ready to accept whatever solutions Serbia and Montenegro 
can agree upon for their future relationship, including the possibility of eventual 
separation.  It should not seek to impose solutions.181  Among the options, the most 
attractive seems to be a single sovereign state, in the form of a “thin”182 federation or 
confederation where the central government will exercise only few powers.  
As for the future status of Bosnia, the alternative of withdrawal, after the elections 
of the 5 October 2002, looks very remote.  Even though the general elections were 
largely in line with international standards for democratic elections, they gave a majority, 
in three main ethnic groups, to the nationalistic parties.  Therefore, disengaging from 
Bosnia would be an admission of failure in combating the forces of nationalism and 
communal hatred.  Moreover, Bosnia could well revert to conflict and violent partition.  
                                          
180 The differences between Montenegro and Kosovo are stark.  In Montenegro the questions of 
creating a loose federation with Serbia is divided along political lines and it has considerable support within 
communities.  For example, a public opinion poll carried out by the Damar agency for the Center for 
Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM), Podgorica, 12 -19 January 2001, shows that only 36% of the 
population supports the alternative of a fully independent state.  While among Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians, 
support for independence is unanimous.  After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace .  
International Crisis Group, p. 71, Information Available on the Internet: www.intl-crisis-
group.org/projects/balkans/balkansregion/reports/A400472_01042001.pdf . 
181 Still Buying Time: Montenegro, Serbia, and the European Union , International Crisis Group, 7 
May 2002, p. ii, Information Available on the Internet: www.intl-crisis-
group.org/projects/balkans/montenegro/reports/A400638_07052002.pdf . 
182 The difference between the federation and thin federation is in the distribution of powers.  In a 
thinner federation, the constituent regional entities exercise much more authority.  After Milosevic: A 
Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace, p. 112.  
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As far as the option of partition, it not only rewards the war aims of Milosevic but 
also destroys the hope of a democratic, multi-ethnic Bosnia.  This option would also run 
the risk of radicalizing a formerly secular population of Bosnia refugees, with grievous 
consequences for regional security.183   
Considering that the leadership of nationalist parties has presented a kind of 
moderation, the international community has to force the government, which would be 
constructed after the elections, to implement fully the integrative aspects of the Dayton 
Peace agreement, particularly the strengthening of central institutions and refugee return.  
The economic and political rewards of the coming government must be conditioned 
based on its concrete performance.  While working wit hin the Dayton framework, the 
Office of the High Representative and Bosnia government can go further with the 
structural adjustments into a post-Dayton arrangement.  The main directions for reform of 
the Dayton structure would be strengthening the central government, reducing the 
substantial fiscal and administrative powers of the cantons, and enhancing the power of 
municipalities.  
As for the security concerns of Macedonia, the elections of 15 September 2002 
suggest that the country may has turned corner toward stability.  Macedonian voters 
elected a government that has embraced the Framework Agreement brokered by the 
European Union (EU), the U.S., and NATO at Ohrid in August 2001.  This agreement 
has not only ended the ethnic wars but has also pledged to manage inter-ethnic issues 
through consensus.  However, cause for serious concern remains because much territory 
in ethnic Albanian dominated areas remain beyond the control of law enforcement.  
Moreover, mistrust between ethnic communities remains blatant.184  That being the case, 
cooperation between NATO, the U.S., and the EU remains essential for the transition 
period that Macedonia has now entered.  Specifically, a military presence such as 
NATO’s Task Force Fox has contributed mightily toward establishing  a secure 
atmosphere that has been crucial for return of those persons displaced by the conflict.  
Therefore, the international community (NATO and the EU) should  continue to provide 
                                          
183 After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace , p. 158. 
184 Moving Macedonia toward Self-sufficiency: A New Security Approach for NATO and the EU , 
International Crisis Group, 15 November 2002, p. 2.  Information Available on the Internet: www.intl-
crisis-group.org/projects/balkans/macedonia/reports/A400823_15112002.pdf . 
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Macedonia with interim security assistance, in particular by maintaining a small military 
force in the country until the Macedonian government can ensure law and order 
throughout its territory. 
2. Relieving the Negative Impact of Ethnic Issues  
Reversing the negative impact of ethnic relations on the development of the 
region requires building reliable mechanisms that do not allow the transformation of 
political, social, economic, and interstate problems into ethnic conflicts.  The 
effectiveness of these mechanisms calls for involvement at the domestic and international 
levels.  
At the domestic level, an increasing sense of mutual responsibility and 
accountability between the ethnic groups can be achieved through satisfying the 
minorities’ demands for education.  A greater access to higher education will contribute 
to the stabilization of ethnic relations.  Improving the economic situation and building 
democratic institutions are the long-term alternatives, which diminishes disparities across 
ethnic lines.  They pave the road for withering of the concept of the nation -state and 
moving toward civil society. 
At the international level, considering that the Western Powers have an 
extraordinary influence over the course of events in South Eastern Europe, their 
intervention is crucial for reducing ethnic conflict.  For example, apart fro m NATO air 
strikes against Serbia because of its treatment of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, the United 
States has also successfully intervened in the dispute between Hungary and Romania over 
the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania.  American intervention made 
possible the signing of a bilateral treaty in 1996, a compromise on issues that appeared to 
be overwhelmingly divisive.  “This example clearly illustrates that the potential of 
instability can be greatly diminished by the yearning of thes e states to become integrated 
into the Western community of nations symbolized by membership in NATO and the 
EU.”185   
 
                                          
185 Ivanka N. Atanassova, The Impact of Ethnic Issues on the Security of South Eastern Europe , 
Report Commissioned by the NATO Office of Information and Press, June 1999, p. 63, Information 
Available Internet: www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/atanassova.pdf . 
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3. First the Transition and Second the Development 
First to be done in any ex-communist country should be the fundamental 
institutional change from non-market and non-democratic institutions to markets and 
democracy.  Without doing this first, it makes no sense to try to develop a society, while 
keeping “alive” the old communist institutions for the sake of development.  This is of 
paramount importance in the case of the SEE countries which are famous for their corrupt 
and inefficient state employees.  Bearing in mind that the transition could follow a high 
share of black-market activities, with corruption, bad and inefficient public governance, it 
should be quick and decisive.  The development will follow as a natural result of the free 
market and democracy.  Freedom works.  Naturally, specific measures are to be taken to 
push for development. 
4. Legality and Legitimacy 
The existing legal systems leave a lot to be desired, but their implementation 
should be the focus of the efforts.  At that level, corruption becomes the key problem.  
Transparency and simplicity of procedures are the main tools to be employed to combat 
corruption, all this in an environment of deregulation, liberalization, and business -
friendly regulations. 
Because governments in the region are often not seen as representative and 
responsive, the introduction of democratic rules and procedures does not bring in 
legitimacy immediately.  Gaining or regaining legitimacy is an issue of building up 
credibility, which is often quite difficult.  It requires a set of consistent and persistent 
policies that involve increased transparency, accountability, and similar characteristics of 
good governance.  However, in any case, the former decisions of the democratic 
institutions should not change if they were lawful, including those cases where the 
political attitude may have changed later.186  Therefore, measures to strengthen 
legitimacy should be adopted and consistently applied but without correcting an error 
with an error. 
                                          
186 For example, in Albania, the agricultural land was distributed to the farmers based on a law 
approved by the democratic parliament in 1992.  Now many politicians are claiming that it was an error to 
distribute it to the farmers and that it should be taken away from the farmers and restored to the ex owners.  
The majority think that the decision of 1992 sh ould be respected, and the ex owners should be 
compensated.  
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Under a market-based system, it is assumed that basic economic freedoms are 
secured, whereby the legal framework provides the basis for this.  In this connection, four 
areas to be observed are ownership, contract, bankruptcy, and competition law.  
· Ownership (property rights) is essential for the introduction of a market 
economy, and this part of legal infrastructure has been mostly provided  
· Contract law is important in a mar ket economy because it sets a 
framework within which all contracts must be drawn up and executed  
· The bankruptcy act is aimed at establishing financial discipline and 
imposing hard budget constraints.  Loss -making enterprises and insolvent 
firms cannot survive.  Therefore, economically, their resources can be 
employed in a new way.187  
· Antimonopoly legislation should ensure competition and prevent 
enterprises from avoiding market discipline and taking advantage of unfair 
competition 
5. Macroeconomic Stabilizat ion 
The establishment of macroeconomic stability is a precondition of both political 
stability and economic growth in the region.  Many Balkan countries have experienced 
high rates of inflation, and exchange rates have demonstrated great volatility.  These 
factors have constrained foreign investment and modernization in the region.  
Macroeconomic stability depends largely on the consistency of economic policy.  
It requires achieving a proper mix between fiscal and monetary policies.  With 
appropriate macroec onomic policies and strong political support, the SEE countries can 
maintain a real exchange rate that will contribute to a stable and strong currency.  It 
means that: 
· More stable conditions will encourage citizens of the SEE to keep their 
money in the banks of their countries and to invest it at home 
· Foreign investors will have more confidence because economies of the 
SEE will send positive signals to Wall Street 
6. Barriers to Trade and Investment  
The SEE countries should get rid of formal and informal barriers.  Development 
depends crucially on the business environment.  If these problems are not addressed 
                                          
187 The methods of bankruptcy are explained in details in: Aghion, D., O. Hart and J. Moore , The 
Economics of Bankruptcy Reform , in O. Blanchard, K., A. Froot, and J. D. Sachs, The Transition in Eastern 
Europe, Vol. 2. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 215 -240. 
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simultaneously and decisively, the old barriers to trade and investment will persist and 
new ones will spring into being.  Implementing legal regulatio n and legal protection is 
one way of combating the informal barriers.  
It should be kept in mind that this vision for the reconstruction and development 
of SEE focuses mainly on the integration with the EU rather than on intra-regional 
coordination.  We stress that opening to the EU will play its positive role only if the 
integration of the region in EU is a “real perspective”.  It means that the EU should 
provide a clear deadline for the integration of the region.  
7. Liberalization 
Liberalization should be done in clear cut rules, without any unneeded 
complications and sophistications.  The custom tariffs should be lowered to extremes, and 
they should be flat, without any sign of protectionism.  Any attempt to complicate the 
rules will be converted into corruption.  The intra-regional liberalization should be 
implemented simultaneously with the removal of the barriers to trade with the EU and 
with the creation of a single market.   
8. Privatization 
Privatization should be completed quickly, in large scale, and in depth.  
Considering that the SEE lack the experience of an able and honest state employee, it is 
clear that the running of the economy should not be left on the hands of these kind of 
employees.  In the SEE economies, this should continue to be seen as the crux of the 
whole process of transition.  Without hampering the speed, privatization must be 
regulated and transparent and market methods should be used as much as possible .   
9. Structural Reforms 
Structural reforms are a key element in increasing the competitiveness of the 
transition economies.  They need to go ahead with privatization, social security, health 
care, education, and local government.  This is the only way in which it will be possible 
to ensure a market-based allocation of resources through financial institutions in 
particular.  Sustained growth will be possible only if transition to a market economy is 
intensive.  Structural reforms will also have a profound and beneficial impact on the 
long-term sustainability of public finances.  Furthermore, structural reforms will enhance 
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job creation.  Labor market flexibility will be increased by adoption of a sound wage 
policy, trade liberalization, and the simplification of tax structures.  If countries in the 
region decrease their current account deficits, increase exports, and raise domestic 
investments, the potential growth in GDP may help bring down the unemployment rate.  
10. Fiscal Consolidation 
Fiscal consolation is crucial to increasing domestic saving, decreasing the current 
account defic it, and reducing the later impact of inflation.  The mobilization of savings 
and their efficient allocation are priority tasks that should be fulfilled by domestic banks 
and non-banking financial institutions. 
11. Infrastructure  
In the region, it is a general agreement about upgrading the infrastructure.  It must 
be kept in mind that, by themselves, infrastructure investments are not enough.  They 
have to pay off.  That is why they must be carefully chosen to enhance transportation and 
lower its costs.  In the Balkans, however, it is clear that many of the links and routes do 
not exist not because there is no profit to be made in doing business across borders or 
regions, but for political or security reasons.  Thus, currently existing infrastructure does 
not reflect the real possibilities of regional economic activity.  Therefore, infrastructure 
investments are critical.  
12. Environment 
There is no fundamental difference between investments in infrastructure and in 
environmental projects.  Both are vital for a developing region.  Therefore, investments in 
the upgrading of the environment should be given the same priority as those in 
infrastructure.  
13. Human Capital Development 
If the acquisition of knowledge and education is not strengthened, the de -
industrialization will be coupled with de-education and then this human capital advantage 
of the Balkan countries over the more typical developing countries will disappear.  
Knowledge and education correlate in various ways with the openness of a country or a 
region.  Therefore, knowledge, education, human capital maintenance and development 
as well as openness to the outside world should be given priority . 
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14. Integration into Europe  
Considering that the prospect of joining the EU holds a powerful attraction 
throughout the region, it is understandable that economic development and political 
reform have the ultimate goal of integrating the SEE into the EU.  In the agenda of 
integration these two steps are critical: 
· A free-trade area modeled after current arrangements  with the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA)  
· A full common market modeled after the current European Economic 
Area (EEA) arrangements188 
15. The EU and the United States  
Since after September 11, the financial contribution of the United States is likely 
to be restricted, the EU should take the lead on the region reconstruction.189  The EU, to 
maintain the rhythm of reforms, should focus on efforts that have the best prospects for 
creating jobs.  Moreover, the assistance for clarifying property rights, relax ing the rules 
on investment, and establishing standard rules for settling disputes is crucial to the 
success of the reforms.  However, U.S. involvement, with minimal financial 
commitment, is essential to catalyzing the process and keeping Balkan reconstruc tion an 
urgent and continuing priority.  If the U.S. will insist to limit its military engagement in 
the region, the EU will need to establish just how much it is prepared to do itself.  
B. CONCLUSION 
The Balkan are not damned by history to suffer perpetual conflict.  De-
Balkanizing is possible with the will of the Balkan peoples and the assistance of the 
international community in forging the costly foundation of the democratic institutions 
that have been laid.  However, everything depends on the will of the Balkan people.  
They have to choose between the extreme nationalism and politics defined through the 
narrow prism of ethnicity which have brought only ruin to the people of Balkans, and the 
forces of peace which are engage toward greater European integration, regional stability, 
and economic development.  Considering that since April 2001, Slobodan Milosevic 
                                          
188 European Economic Area: EU Plus Norway and Iceland.  Morton Abramowitz, Albert Fishlow,  
and Charles A. Kupchan, Independent Task Force Report: Reconstructing the Balkans,  Council on Foreign 
Relations, July 1999, p. 4, Information Avai lable on the Internet: www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr16/. 
189 Even before September 11, President Clinton, arguing that the United States assumed the primary 
burden of the air campaign, made clear that Europe wil l bear the major costs of reconstructing the region.  
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stands behind the bars, it seems that most citizens throughout the SEE are eager to leave 
war behind and live in peace.  However, the foundations for a solid stability in the region 
are far from complete.   
Besides its low level of development, the SEE is integral part of Europe.  
Therefore, it could expect committed and sustained assistance from the EU in its efforts 
to transition and achieve an acceptable level of development.  Clearly, a regional 
commitment to transition and to regional integration is crucial, too.  Additionally, it is 
important that the public and private agents inside and outside of the region work on 
setting up business-friendly institutions and implementing policies in order to open up 
opportunities for stability, investment, trade, increased employment and sustained 
growth.  Western capitals have to avoid the dangerous tendency of focusing only on the 
issues that dominates the headlines.  Slobodan Milosevic was not the only source of 
instability in the region.   
Investigating the long-term, deep historical roots of conflicts has been important 
in this thesis for having a better understanding of the nature and the origin of the conflicts 
of the last decade.  This and all the errors, mistakes, and missteps of the past decade 
provided valuable lessons for developing this strategy, which shows the way for peace to 
triumph over division and hatred.  
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Appendix 1   South Eastern Europe: Main Macroeconomic Indicators  
 
     1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
                                  
Real GDP Growth (percent change)  
Albania                                                               -7.0      8.0      7.3       7.8       7.3      
Bosnia and Herzegovina           36.6      9.9      9.9       5.9       6.2 
Bulgaria          -7.0      3.5      2.4       5.8       4.5 
Croatia           6.6             2.5     -0.4       3.7       4.0 
FYR Macedonia          1.4      3.4      4.3                4.3     -4.0  
Romania          -6.1     -5.4     -2.3       1.6       4.5 
FR Yugoslavia         10.1       1.9   -15.7       5.0       5.0 
  Median SEE                   1.4      3.4      2.4       5.0       4.5 
  Median CEEC-8  1/          6.5      4.5      1.5       4.5       4.0   
End of period inflation, percent  
Albania                                                               42.1      8.7     -1.0       4.2       3.0      
Bosnia and Herzegovina              …       5.6    14.0     16.1        …  
Bulgaria       549.2      1.7      7.0     11.4       4.0 
Croatia           3.8             5.4      4.4       7.4       4.5 
FYR Macedonia          3.2     -2.4      2.6                6.1      6.2 
Romania       151.4     40.6    54.8     40.7     29.0 
FR Yugoslavia           …      44.5    49.9   113.5     35.0 
  Median SEE                 42.1       5.6      7.0     11.4       5.4 
  Median CEEC-8  1/        10.0       6.5      3.8       4.9       3.9 
Fiscal deficit, in percent of GDP  2/  
Albania                                                              -12.8   -10.4   -11.4      -9.1      -9.5      
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 /             …      -2.2     -3.3      -4.0               … 
Bulgaria          -2.5      1.0     -1.0      -1.1      -0.5  
Croatia          -2.0            -3.0      -7.4      -5.7      -5.3  
FYR Macedonia         -3.0     -1.7      0.0                2.5     -7.8  
Romania          -5.2     -5.5     -3.8      -3.7      -3.5  
FR Yugoslavia 4/           …         …         …       -0 .2      -2.8  
  Median SEE                  -2.5     -2.6     -3.5      -3.7      -4.4  
  Median CEEC-8  1/         -1.9     -2.8     -3.6      -2.9      -2.2  
Current account deficit, in percent of GDP   
Albania                                                              -12.1     -6.1     -7.2      -7.0      -7.5      
Bosnia and Herzegovina          -42.0   -23.7   -21.0    -19.0    -20.3  
Bulgaria           4.4     -0.5     -5.3      -5.8      -6.7  
Croatia        -11.6            -7.1      -6.9      -2.1      -3.8  
FYR Macedonia         -7.6     -9.7     -3.4               -3.1   -14.7  
Romania          -6.1     -7.1     -4.1      -3.9      -6.0  
FR Yugoslavia         -9.4     -4.8     -7.5      -7.6    -16.4  
  Median SEE                  -9.4     -7.1     -6.9      -5.8      -7.5  
  Median CEEC-8  1/         -5.6     -7.0     -4.8      -5.3      -5.3  
 
 
Source: WEO, IMF Staff estimates and projections  
1/ CEEC – 8 are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic  
2/ General government budget balance, where available.  
3/ Includes State and entity budget. 







Appendix 2   South Eastern Europe: External Trade  
(millions  of US dollars, unless otherwise indicated ) 
 
    1997  1998 1999 2000 
   
                                        
Export of Goods 
 
SEE                                                                      21873           22327           20698         23975 
Albania                                                                     167    205    275   256 
Bosnia and Herzegovina        575   697    649   732 
Bulgaria                      4809             4194  4006 4812 
Croatia                      4210             4604  4395 4567        
FYR Macedonia                     1235 1292  1192 1319         
Romania                      8431 8302  8503         10366        
FR Yugoslavia                     2447 3033  1677 1923  
             
Imports of Goods 
 
SEE                                                                      33777           50296            31036        34813  
Albania                                                                     685    826   1121          1070 
Bosnia and Herzegovina                      2333 2656   2502          2348 
Bulgaria                      4488             4574   5087 5988 
Croatia                      9407             8752   7693 7771        
FYR Macedonia                     1623 1711   1601 1875         
Romania                    10411           10927   9736        12050        
FR Yugoslavia                     4799 4849   3296 3711 
         
Trade openness 1/ 
 
SEE                                                                         78.6               72.5             74.8             86.9 
Albania                                                                    46.5     41.3   55.2   59.3 
Bosnia and Herzegovina                     102.5    98.4   78.2   77.1 
Bulgaria                     126.4               97.7   99.6 122.1 
Croatia                       97.7               88.8   89.2             95.8        
FYR Macedonia                      87.9   99.8   98.0 114.4        
Romania                       65.5   56.1   62.6             73.7        
FR Yugoslavia                      50.9   66.4    56.0   81.2  
             
   
  
  Source: IMF and National Authorities 
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